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ABSTRACT
Developing countries have increasingly resorted to the use of tax incentives to attract FDI,
despite existing evidence of the shortcomings of tax incentives. In sub-Saharan Africa, tax
incentives are a prominent feature of many investment codes. Sub-Saharan African
countries find tax incentives as a means of attracting FDI because there are no viable
alternatives per se, and they believe that tax incentives can be structured to ensure that FDI
advances socio-economic and technological development. But the reliance on tax
incentives at the expense of maximizing domestic tax revenue poses a challenge to
sustainable development. This study examines Ghana and Kenya to see which of them will
better achieve this balance, and makes recommendations on how this balance can be
enhanced. The study finds that tax incentives are not well designed and administered. The
recommendations suggest that legislative and administrative reforms be undertaken to
make tax incentives more effective.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Developing countries have increasingly resorted to the use of tax incentives to
attract FDI, despite existing evidence of the shortcomings of tax incentives. In sub-Saharan
Africa countries, tax incentives are a prominent feature of many tax codes.1 Although rates
vary widely by jurisdiction, in most cases, tax rates remain attractively low, and there are
various tax incentive schemes, including tax holidays, preferential tax rates, manufacturing
zones, and concessionary tax arrangements, that are designed to promote investment. In
many cases, tax incentive packages are further reinforced by BITs or DTAs that reduce the
source country’s ability to impose tax on income earned by non-residents. The paradox,
however, is that although in most cases tax incentives have not brought about the needed
investment, and result in revenue loss and other unintended consequences, they continue
to be offered.2
Considering the developmental needs of sub-Saharan African countries, the
importance of raising adequate tax revenue cannot be overlooked. But as emphasis is laid
on the potential of tax incentives as part of general pro-market liberalization measures to
attract FDI, policy efforts to use tax incentives to stimulate FDI inflows in Sub-Saharan
African countries have increased. However, the attention of sub-Saharan African policymakers and citizens is not often drawn to the potential downside of tax incentives. Although
at first tax incentives appear to be costless because they do not seem to affect the current

1

See Howell H. Zee, Janet G. Stotsky & Eduardo Ley, “Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer
for Policy Makers in Developing Countries” (2002) 30:9 WD 1497-1516 at 1497.
2
See EY, “Tax Insights for business leaders № 13” (1 November 2015), online: EY <www.ey.com>
[perma.cc/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-tax-insights-for-business-leaders-issue-14/$file/ey-tax-insights-forbusiness-leaders-issue-14.pdf] at 9.
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budget, they may entail significant costs. For sub-Saharan African countries in particular,
there are three main reasons the use of tax incentives to attract FDI may not be the right
approach for them.
First, the widespread use of tax incentives to attract FDI in sub-Saharan African
countries can jeopardize public revenues. Tax incentives risk crowding out the significance
of taxes and crippling efforts in raising domestic revenue for development. As barriers to
the global movement of capital decline, 3 and the potential of FDI as a significant external
source of financing for emerging economies is becoming increasingly acknowledged,4
attracting global capital, even at the risk of losing domestic revenue, risks becoming a
major practice in sub-Saharan Africa. However, juxtaposed with the risk of potential
revenue loss, attracting FDI remains just a tip of the iceberg of the ills of tax incentives.
Second, tax incentives have inherent costs, which if not well provided for, may
outweigh their benefits and erode the tax base. Tax incentives come with increased
administrative and compliance costs and require that excessive tax planning and antiavoiding strategies be put in place. Furthermore, tax incentives can result in economic
distortions, engender corruption, and benefit TNCs and home countries more than host
countries. 5

3

Eric Zolt, “Tax Incentives: Protecting the tax base” (Paper for Workshop on Tax Incentives and Base
Protection, New York, 23-24 April 2015) [unpublished] at 1 [Zolt].
4
According to UNCTAD (2018), in 2017, 65 countries and economies adopted at least 126 investment policy
measures: 84 per cent of the measures were favourable to investors. See UNCTAD, “World Investment
Report
2018”
(2018),
online
(pdf):
UNCTAD
<unctad.org>
[perma.cc/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf] at viii.
5
See Jasna Bogovac, “The Paradox of Tax Incentives in Developing Countries” (Paper for Conference on
System of Financial Law, Mikulov, Czech Republic, September 2014) at 1 [Bogovac].

2

Third, both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that Sub-Saharan African
countries’ governments are paying too much by using tax incentives to attract investment.
Although tax incentives have been widely used to promote investments in sub-Saharan
Africa countries, they have not been effective, and their impact has been detrimental. Only
a small number of them have had marked success, many more have failed and have been
abused by both investors and government officials: only the interests of a few elite
individuals and TNCs have been served – the states and the citizens have been left worse
off.
Ghana and Kenya provide useful illustrations of some of the risks of using tax
incentives to attract FDI. In Ghana, tax incentives have been determined to have an adverse
impact on domestic tax revenue, and an overall damaging effect on the welfare of the
country. Analysis of the use of tax incentive between 2008 and 2013 revealed that tax
incentives accounted for a loss (tax expenditure) of about 14.18 per cent to 41.20 per cent
of total tax revenue, about 1.80 per cent to 5.31 per cent of total GDP.6 Similarly, in Kenya,
tax incentives have been found to deprive the country of revenue needed to improve the
general welfare of the population. 7 It is estimated that over USD 1.1 billion is lost annually
through the use of tax incentives. In the fiscal year 2009-10, an estimated amount of USD
3.05 billion, about 3.1 per cent of Kenya’s GDP, was projected to have been lost mostly
through tax incentives. Moreover, in most of these countries, the use of a wide range of tax

6

See Tax Justice Network-Africa, “The West African Giveaway: Use and Abuse of Corporate Tax Incentives
in ECOWAS” (2015) Report for ActionAid International (August 2015) at 1-20 [Tax Justice NetworkAfrica]; Wilson Prichard & Isaac Bentum, “Taxation and Development in Ghana: Finance, Equity and
Accountability” in Ghana Report, eds, Matti Kohonen, Steve Manteaw & Alvin Mosioma (Tax Justice
Network, 2009) at 24-26 [Wilson & Bentum].
7
See Oxfam, “Taxing for a More Equal Kenya – A five point action plan to fight inequality” (5 December
2017), online: Oxfam <cng-cdn.oxfam.org/ken> [perma.cc/kenya.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments] at
18, 25 [Oxfam].

3

incentives has resulted in the neglect of other desirable goals associated with taxation, such
as simplifying the tax system, strengthening tax administration, and achieving equity in the
tax burden. 8
Therefore, any attempt to consider tax incentives as an economic policy option must
be balanced with a due consideration of the potential harmful effects of tax incentives. Tax
incentive programmes must be well designed to maximize efficiency and effectiveness. In
other words, even where tax incentives clearly play an important role in attracting new
investment, the cost at which that may come – which is often significant – must be
considered.9 More so, this is required given that most tax incentive schemes are likely to
result in small incremental new investment. 10 Furthermore, the inherent costs of tax
incentives in terms of the economic distortions that are associated with them, and the
opportunity for rent-seeking and corruption that come along with them, must also be taken
into consideration.
However, it appears these factors are overlooked in the design and administration
of tax incentives in most sub-Saharan African countries. Tax incentive programmes often
suffer from weak design, lack of transparency, administrative inefficiencies, and are not
properly targeted. Even where tax incentives ought to be targeted at particular kinds of

8

Ibid.
According to UN (2018), tax incentives have traditionally been used by governments as tools to promote a
particular economic goal. They are preferential tax treatments that are offered to a selected group of taxpayers
and take the form of exemptions, tax holidays, credits, investment allowances, preferential tax rates and
import tariffs (or customs duties), and deferral of tax liability. As a matter of fact, developed countries
normally use tax incentives to promote research and development activities, export activities, and support the
competitiveness of their enterprises in the global market; while developing countries use them to attract
foreign investment and foster national industries. See UN, Design and Assessment of Tax Incentives in
Developing Countries: Selected Issues and A Country Experience (New York: United Nations, 2018) [UN,
2018] at ii-iii.
10
See George E. Lent, “Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing Countries” (1967) 14:2 IMF Staff
Papers 249-323 at 249 [Lent].
9

4

FDI (like efficiency-seeking FDI), they are often offered to all investors, including those
motivated by access to natural resources or market, who are less likely to respond to tax
incentives.11
As such, the reliance on tax incentives to attract FDI in Sub-Saharan African
countries poses a challenge to sustainable development. This situation, if not realized and
addressed in time, will derail the efforts of sub-Saharan African countries and hinder their
ability to leverage on the potential of FDI as a major source of external financing for
development. Therefore, it is worth asking whether tax incentives constitute beneficial tax
policies for sub-Saharan African countries, or only favour corrupt government officials,
and investors and their home countries. 12 Should sub-Saharan African countries abandon
the use of tax incentives to attract FDI, and rather focus on maximizing tax revenue?
Most of these countries wish that tax incentives achieved better results, or that other
countries did not offer tax incentives, and that all investors pay their taxes. However,
because most other countries, including developed countries, offer tax incentives, subSaharan African countries often feel obliged to do so, even to the point where they offer
more than others to retain their “competitive” position, without careful thought about their
impact on domestic revenue. 13
The question then is: how can sub-Saharan African countries improve the
effectiveness of tax incentives offered in order to increase FDI inflows and at the same

11

See Maria R. Andersen, Benjamin R. Kett & Erik von Uexkull, “Corporate Tax Incentives and FDI in
Developing Countries” in World Bank Group, ed Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018:
Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2018) at 73
[Andersen, Kett & von Uexkull].
12
See Andres E. Bazo, “Tax Incentives Offered by Developing Countries: Attracting Foreign Investment or
Creating Disaster?” (2008) 52:4 TNI 1-23 at 1.
13
Andersen, Kett & von Uexkull, supra note 11 at 73.
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time maximize tax revenue? In other words, how can sub-Saharan African countries design
their tax incentives to achieve the objective of attracting FDI, but minimize the risk of
revenue loss?
The ideal for sub-Saharan African countries is that the economic benefits of the
additional FDI attracted through tax incentives out-weigh the revenue loss from enterprises
that would have invested without concessionary tax treatment. 14 This requires a wellthought-out approach to the design and administration of tax incentives within these
jurisdictions. The starting point is critical study of the tax incentive regimes within the subregion, and benchmarking them with best practice.

A. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
As policymakers in sub-Saharan African countries seek to use tax incentives to
attract FDI, the ideal objective should be to achieve the greatest possible benefits at the
lowest cost. This will require that tax incentives be designed to maximize FDI flows,
minimise potential revenue loss, and reduce the opportunity for rent-seeking and
corruption. Tax incentives should be targeted at only those investors who would have
invested in another jurisdiction, but for the tax incentives offered. Granting tax concessions
to those investors whose decision to invest is not determined by potential tax benefits will
just amount to a transfer of wealth which otherwise would have accrued as tax revenue to
the government to the investor or the investor’s home government. 15

14

See Lent, supra note 10 at 249.
Zolt, supra note 3 at 1. See also Kim Brooks, “Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment
in Low-Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?” (2009) 34 QLJ 505-564 at 505 [Kim
Brooks].
15

6

The challenge is that sub-Saharan African countries are caught in a tax-incentive
trap: despite the existence of empirical evidence pointing to the inefficient and ineffective
use of tax incentives in sub-Saharan African countries, these countries continue to grant
tax incentives, and design new ones. In view of this dilemma, what measure can subSaharan African countries adopt to maximize their gains – i.e., attract the desired level of
FDI through the use of tax incentive schemes, as well as reduce the risk of revenue loss? 16
This study proposes to answer this question – that is, what policy measures must
sub-Saharan African countries adopt to make tax incentive schemes effective in attracting
FDI and at the same time maximize tax revenue? In order to develop a contextual
framework within which the research question can be answered, other related policy
questions are also explored in the study, such as: are tax incentives effective in attracting
FDI? Why do sub-Saharan African countries or developing countries in general continue
to offer tax incentives to attract investment? And, are sub-Saharan African countries
offering overly generous tax incentives and foregoing revenue much needed for
development?
In a simple analysis of the situation, it may be argued that if tax incentives are
designed to promote and facilitate investment, then the regime offering more tax incentives
should attract higher FDI inflows. Yet the other side of the argument is that such a regime
may not be maximizing revenue from taxes, at least in the short run. That country may be
giving away too much of its revenue in tax concessions – and where all countries give such
incentives, the result will be poverty and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa.

16

See Philippa Biggs, “Tax Incentives to Attract FDI (Geneva, 8-9 March 2007, UNCTAD Meeting of
Experts on FDI, Technology and Competitiveness) at 9-11.

7

B. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The study reviews the tax incentive regimes in sub-Saharan African countries with
the purpose of recommending a practical approach, derived from a careful analysis of the
specific cases of two sub-Saharan African countries, to designing and administering
efficient and effective tax incentives in of sub-Saharan African countries. As way to
explore standard principles for designing efficient and effective tax incentive regimes in
sub-Saharan African countries, the study analyses and evaluates the relative effectiveness
of the different tax incentive regimes in promoting and attracting FDI in sub-Saharan
African countries. It also examines theoretical and empirical evidence of the impact of tax
incentives on FDI and domestic tax revenue in sub-Saharan African countries, and other
jurisdictions (both developing and developed countries). The aim is to identify inherent
weaknesses in the design and implementation of tax incentives in sub-Saharan African
countries, and recommend ways that can be improved upon, based on global practice.
The objective is for both academic and policy purposes – the study will provide tax
policy researchers and tax administrators in sub-Saharan African countries with a
pragmatic and easy-to-implement approach to the design, assessment and administration
of tax incentive programmes. In order to promote the sustainable use of tax incentives in
sub-Saharan African countries, there is the need for policy reform, coordination and
harmonization within the sub-region. Legislative reforms aimed at improving tax incentive
administration, and promoting greater tax efficiency and effectiveness in attracting FDI in
sub-Saharan African countries also will have to be undertaken. 17

17

Meinzer et al, “Comparing tax incentives across jurisdictions: a pilot study” (3 January 2019), online (pdf):
tax justice network <www.taxjustice.net> [perma.cc/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Comparing-tax-

8

The study also brings to the fore the need to increase accountability and
transparency of tax incentives, and provide guidelines for the design and operation of tax
incentives in sub-Saharan African countries. Among other recommendations, it proposes
that tax incentive budgets be prepared to ensure general tax expenditure analysis, to enable
tax policy experts and tax administrations make more informed decisions in designing tax
incentive schemes.

C. THE STUDY METHODOLOGY
The study is a comparative analysis of the tax incentive regimes in sub-Saharan
African countries.18 It comprises theoretical and empirical assessment of the relative
effectiveness of tax incentive programmes across sub-Saharan African countries. The study
uses Ghana and Kenya as case studies. As such, it looks at the similarities and differences
in the tax incentives regimes of the two countries, and attempts to determine which of the
two regimes facilitates more FDI and why. The overall objective is to recommend ways to
improve the effectiveness of tax incentives in sub-Saharan African countries. Even though
the study is designed to provide a basis for drawing an inferential conclusion on the
effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI in sub-Saharan African countries, data and
the literature on the subject from other jurisdictions, including other developing and
developed countries, are employed in the analyses.
Ghana and Kenya have been chosen for the study because both countries offer tax
incentives including tax holidays, tax amnesties, ID allowances, customs duty exemptions,
incentives-across-jurisdictions_Tax-Justice-Network_2019.pdf] at 4 [Meinzer et al]; Bogovac, supra note 5
at 1.
18
Ibid at 1.

9

and concessionary CIT rates. Ghana’s tax incentive regime comprises several pieces of
legislation including, the ITA, 2015 (Act 896), the GIPC Act, 2013 (Act 865), the FZA,
1995 (Act 405), the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703), Minerals and the Mining
Act, 2010 (Act 794).19 Similarly, Kenya’s tax incentives are provided for under various
pieces of legislation, including the IPA; the ITA; the EPZA; and the SEZA. 20
However, despite the commonalities, there are also differences that make Ghana
and Kenya good independent cases for the purpose of comparative analysis. The major
disparities are that the two countries are geographically distant from each other, and belong
to separate regional economic blocs. 21 Kenya, on the east, is a member of the EAC and the
common COMESA; and Ghana, on the west, belongs the ECOWAS.
The study comprises five Chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and
theoretical background to the study. It offers an outline of the general framework of the
study, and sets the bounds within which the study is conducted, including the significance,
the methodology, and the limitations. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on countries’ use of
tax incentives to attract FDI. It explores the subject by identifying contemporary scholarly

19

See the Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896) (Ghana) [ITA Ghana]; Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act
2013 (Act 865) (Ghana) [GIPC Act 2013]; Free Zone Act, 1995 (Act 504) (Ghana) [FZA]; Minerals and
Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703) (Ghana); Minerals and the Mining Act, 2010 (Act 794) (Ghana).
20
See Income Tax Act, 1973 (CAP. 470) (Kenya) [ITA Kenya]; Investment Promotion Act, 2004 (Act No. 6
of 2004) (Kenya) [IPA]; Export Processing Zones Act, 1990 (CAP. 517) (Kenya) [EPZA]; Special Economic
Zones Act, 2015 (Act No. 16 of 2015) (Kenya) [SEZA].
21
Even though the criteria for the selection of cases for a comparative analysis depends on the purpose of the
study, generally, cases should be representative of the population, and the results obtained from the study
generalisable, and applicable to the whole population. Purposive modes of selection is required to choose
cases that most reflect the population characteristics. Selecting good cases require in-depth familiarity of
each case, and the criteria considers factors such as, whether the cases are typical, diverse, extreme, deviant,
influential, most similar or most different, of the population characteristics. See Jason Seawright & John
Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative
Options” (2008) 61:2 PRQ 294-308 at 294. See also Chinonso Okafor, “How to choose an appropriate case
study for your research project” (27 August 2017), online (blog): Classgist <www.classgist.com>
[perma.cc/blogs/64/how-to-choose-an-appropriate-case-study-for-y.aspx].
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and policy debates, and ways that the literature suggests developing countries can
maximize the benefits of using tax incentives to promote and attract FDI.
Chapter 3 discusses the tax incentives regime for the promotion, attraction and
facilitation of FDI in Ghana. It begins with a brief overview of the regulatory framework
for FDI and tax incentives in the country. It then reviews empirical evidence of the impact
of various legislative reforms on FDI over the period 1985-2017. Next, the main tax
incentives for promoting FDI in Ghana are considered. The chapter concludes with an
analysis of the impact of tax incentives in the natural resource sector, and the operations of
FZs in Ghana.
Chapter 4 discusses the tax incentive regime in Kenya. It begins with a brief
overview of the regulatory regime of investment in the country. It then looks at the impact
of tax policy reforms on FDI for the period 1963-2020. This is followed by a discussion of
the framework of tax incentives, and the major tax incentive schemes employed. It
concludes by assessing the potential effectiveness of the tax incentives offered in Kenya.
Chapter 5 offers an analysis of tax incentives in Ghana and Kenya under five main
incentive categories: tax exemption and tax amnesty schemes, general reduced CIT rates,
targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate, DTAs, and import duty exemption and reduced
excise duty schemes. The analysis indicates that both countries have similar tax incentive
regimes, and the impact of tax incentives on domestic revenue has been undesirable. The
chapter makes recommendations that tax incentives schemes should be designed to achieve
clarity in objective and purpose, be simple and transparent, be targeted at efficiencyseeking FDI, and be consolidated under one enactment and one authority – the Minister of
Finance and Economic Planning, to be enforced and monitored by the tax authorities.
11

Chapter 6 provides the summary and conclusion of the study. Similar conclusions
were reached for both Ghana and Kenya that in view of the fact that tax incentives have
resulted in large revenue losses, it is important that both countries review their tax incentive
strategies, minimise the use of tax incentives, and focus on creating an enabling investment
environment through measures such as good governance, rule of law, prudent
macroeconomic management, security enhancing policies, infrastructural development,
openness to trade, and human resource development.

E. LIMITATIONS
Generally, the objective in assessing the performance of tax incentive schemes is
to determine the incremental investment due to tax incentives, and the costs and benefits
associated with attracting that investment. This requires making assumptions regarding the
amount of investment that would have been made without the tax incentive programme,
and the amount of revenue foregone due to the grant of the tax incentive. 22 Practically, it
will be difficult to develop a framework that will determine which investment is undertaken
solely due to tax incentives, or estimate what the levels of investment would be with or
without the existence of tax incentives.23
The following general limitations are recognised. First, care should be taken in
generalizing the outcomes, and in applying them to other countries. Although, where
available, the study draws on data and other information from other jurisdictions, as a
comparative analysis, the study focused much on the tax incentive regimes in Ghana and

22
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Zolt, supra note 3 at 1; Meinzer et al, supra note 17 at 1.
Ibid.
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Kenya. Even within these two jurisdictions, due to the limited availability of data, much of
the review of the impact of tax incentives on FDI is based on existing research findings,
and analysis of secondary data.
Second, circumspection is required in any attempt to make relative judgments about
the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI, or any other variable, in the two
countries used as case studies. Although much consideration was given in selecting the
countries as sample for the study, differences in tax incentive regimes and outcomes may
reflect differences in other investment factors such as, markets size, resource endowment,
business opportunities, political and social factors, and the general investment climate.
Furthermore, the study is not for the purpose of making relative evaluation of the general
administrative efficiency and effectiveness, governance, resource allocation, any other
measure (political or social), or the general state of affairs in the two countries. 24
Third, as acknowledged in much of the study, there are many other policy variables
that may determine the FDI-attractiveness of a country, apart from tax incentives.
Occasionally in the study, the effect of these variables are held constant in order to highlight
the impact of tax incentives as the primary variable. However, in the end, an overall
analysis is presented, taking into consideration the interplay of all possible variables in
determining the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI.25
Fourth, in determining the effectiveness of tax incentives in both Ghana and Kenya,
the study relied on investment survey reports and other secondary data. This is because,
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despite the popularity and widespread use of tax incentives in sub-Saharan African
countries, assessment in terms of tax expenditure reports are rarely conducted.
Additionally, there is an absence of reliable data on actual investments made, their direct
and indirect benefits, and their cost in terms of direct spending or revenue loss. This is due
to the fact that, generally, there have not been systematic reviews of the effectiveness of
the various incentives programmes offered in the two countries. 26
Finally, there is the general difficulty of relying on the results of different studies,
with different data sources, methodologies and limitations, carried out at different points
in time, and in different jurisdictions, to come to a general conclusion. 27

F. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, notwithstanding the limitations acknowledged or any other
circumstance, it is hoped that the outcome of the study will form a strong basis for reform,
and where applicable, coordination and harmonization in the design and administration of
tax incentives sub-Saharan African countries. It is also hoped that the study will add to the
body of knowledge available on the subject, and serve as a foundation for further research
in tax incentives and FDI attraction in sub-Saharan Africa. Even in the short run, based on
some of the recommendations offered, sub-Saharan African countries can begin unilateral
reforms to make tax incentives better targeted and more efficient. By identifying and refocusing tax incentive policies on investments which are most likely to respond favourably,
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sub-Saharan African countries can reduce the unnecessary loss of tax revenue resulting
from the grant of tax incentives. Further, sub-Saharan African governments should focus
on improving investment fundamentals, promote administrative transparency and the rule
of law, and maximize efficient tax collection rather than offer tax incentives. This way,
tax incentives can have the desired impact in inducing investment in sub-Saharan African
countries, and result less in revenue leakage.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature on countries’ use of tax incentives to attract FDI.
It explores the subject by identifying contemporary scholarly and policy debates and ways
that literature suggests developing countries can maximize the benefits from using tax
incentives.28
Although the existing literature is not conclusive on the role of tax incentives in
attracting FDI and creating employment, there is clear consensus that careful study of the
effect of tax incentives on FDI and employment is worthwhile. Both theoretical and
empirical evidence on the subject present a mixed result; some studies have found tax
incentives to have a significant positive effect on FDI, yet others have found that tax
incentives do not have a major effect on FDI. 29 However, the use of tax incentives as a
strategy to attract FDI continues to receive favourable attention in various countries. 30
Why do countries continue to grant tax incentives, even though evidence on the
subject is inconclusive? Why do tax incentives seem to work in some countries and not in
others? What are some of the measures to ensure that tax incentives are well designed to
achieve the desired results? This chapter attempts to answer these questions. It is organized
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This excerpt is adapted from my term research paper in International Taxation II, Winter, 2019 entitled
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Peters & Bariyima D. Kiabel, “Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria” (2015) 6:5 IOSRJEF 10-20 at page 1). Also, UNCTAD (2000) noted that nearly all countries offer tax incentives even though
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in four parts. It begins by an attempt to distinguish tax incentives from the general or
normative tax system, drawing on the pioneering work of Stanley S. Surrey. 31
Tax incentives come in various designs. The second section of this chapter looks at
six different tax incentives schemes commonly offered across countries to provide further
insight on the practical design and application of tax incentives.
The third sections examines evidence on the use of tax incentives and the
effectiveness of tax incentives in both developing and developed countries. It suggests
that, largely, the objective of using tax incentives is to promote economic goals, such as
employment and market efficiency. It also finds that much of the evidence is to the effect
that, even though tax incentives are not desirable in most situations, tax incentives are more
likely effective in developed countries than in developing countries. It also suggests that,
among others, developing countries may resort to the use of tax incentives as a result of
international competition, or pressure from TNCs.
The final section looks at some the measures to ensure that tax incentives achieve
the desired result. Among others, it identifies factors including setting clear and measurable
objectives, and having tax incentives well spelt out and consolidated in legislation, as some
of the desirable characteristics of an effective tax incentive scheme. The section also
explores the policy debate whether tax incentives should be limited to only foreign
investment, or tax incentives should be of benefit to domestic and local investors as well.
The chapter concludes by noting that although tax incentives may help boost
domestic FDI inflows, they will not alone make up for serious deficiencies in the
investment climate. Therefore, developing countries must focus on building a favourable
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University Press, 1974).

17

investment climate, and ensure transparency and accountability in the use of tax incentive
policies. It further recommends that the award and monitoring of tax incentives be guided
by the rule of law.

A. DEFINITION OF TAX INCENTIVES
There is a major challenge of defining tax incentives, and a general conceptual
problem of identifying and drawing a fine line between tax incentives (or tax expenditures)
and the general or normative tax system. The attempt to delimit or draw a distinction
between the two systems, and establish the relationship between them, can be credited to
Stanley Surrey’s work in 1974.32 He began the scholarly work of conceiving tax incentives
as special treatments, or separate schemes from the general tax system, and a deliberate
departure from accepted concepts of income tax. He identified that through special
schemes, such as exemptions, deductions, tax credits, preferential tax rates, and tax
deferrals, the tax system may operate to achieve the effect that a direct budget expenditure
may be designed to accomplish. 33
He further identified that tax incentives constitute a system of tax expenditures
under which governmental financial assistance programs are carried out through special
tax provisions, as against the provisions of the ITA (or any other tax legislation) which
may form the basis for taxing individual and corporate incomes. In other words, a tax
incentive scheme can be conceived as a special provision or an alternative system to direct
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Ibid at 3-7.
Ibid.

18

government expenditures, such as, grants, and loans, and a subsidy scheme that relies on
the framework of the income tax system as a method of disbursement. 34
He also observed that the concept of tax incentives can be considered as consisting
of two legs: the imputed tax payment (that would have been made in the absence of the tax
incentive), and the accompanying expenditure of that payment as a direct grant to the
beneficiary. He further asserted that although tax incentive schemes have a similar purpose
as direct government expenditures, they may have little or no basic relation to the design
and operation of such direct expenditures. Any given program involving fiscal assistance
may be designed to use the tax system to provide that assistance (which may be referred to
as a tax incentive), or a direct government assistance (which may be referred to as a direct
expenditure). That is, the incentive process assumes payment of the proper tax by the
taxpayer, and an appropriation by the government of an expenditure made to that taxpayer
in the amount of the incentive benefit. 35
Since Surrey’s work, many other definitions of tax incentives have been adopted.
For example, the IMF et al (2015) define tax incentives are as special tax provisions which
are a favourable deviation from the general tax laws, granted to selected investment
projects or firms. 36 From this simple definition, it can be deduced that tax incentives
constitute a deliberate policy that exempts an entity from a tax liability or grants an entity
a concession to a tax liability. 37 The intention for granting tax incentives is to favour
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investors, through exceptional or concessionary provisions in the tax laws, compared to the
general standard tax system. Tax incentives are part of general fiscal tools, such as, sector
prioritization, infrastructural development, and in extreme cases, assignment of monopoly
rights, to attract investments.
Furthermore, tax incentives are exceptions to the general tax regime, and include
favourable tax treatments as a means of inducing investors to invest in specific projects or
sectors. Tax incentives are measurable advantages, specifically designed either to increase
the rate of return, or reduce the costs or risks of a specific FDI undertaking, or domestic
enterprises, for the purpose of securing investment.38 To qualify as a tax incentive, a
measure must provide for an explicit favourable tax treatment of particular sectors, or type
of firms, or activities, or investment, as against the standard applicable in the industry as a
whole. 39
Also, tax incentives can be defined as policies that provide for a more favourable
tax treatment of some enterprises or sectors as against what is available to the general
industry.40 In this sense, tax incentives can be considered special provisions that allow for
exclusions, credits, preferential tax rates, or deferral of tax liability. 41 Examples of tax
incentives include reduced tax rates on profits, tax holidays, accelerated depreciation and
loss carry forwards for tax purposes, reduced tariffs on imported equipment and raw
materials (or increased tariffs to protect import substituting investment), special zones,
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investment tax credits, investment allowances, exemptions from various taxes, and
financing incentives.42
Further, it must be noted that, generally, tax incentives can be classified into two
broad categories based on their mode of operation – cost-based tax incentives and profitbased tax incentives. Cost-based tax incentives operate to reduce the cost of investment,
and profit-based tax incentives operate to reduce the tax rate on taxable income, or
eliminate tax altogether. For example, import duty exemptions may be targeted at reducing
the cost of plant, machinery and equipment, while tax holidays may waive CIT for a given
period.43
Profit-based tax incentives may be better suited to attract short-term investments,
and cost-based tax incentives may be suitable for long-term investments.44 In their design,
cost-based incentives (like accelerated depreciation) are targeted at capital intensive longterm investments in order to decrease the cost of capital – their benefits are designed to be
realised over the life time of the assets. On the other hand, profit-based incentives (like tax
holidays) are targeted at short-term, low capital investments, with quick returns. They are
usually granted over the early years of an investment, and their benefits are designed to be
realised only in the short-term.
Thus, cost-based incentives are of benefit, or accrue to investors only if capital
investments are made, and may be appropriate for targeting long-term investments in
industries, like mining, and oil and gas, in which returns are realised over a longer period
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of time. This makes them unsuitable for short-term investments. However, profit-based
incentives have their benefits accruing as soon as the firm begins to make profits. This
makes them suitable for short-term projects with low upfront investment costs, and quick
returns.45
It is advisable that tax incentives should not be limited to only foreign investors,
but should be equally available to domestic investors. The justification is that domestic
investors are likely to be operating in fundamental sectors of the economy in which the
positive impact of favourable tax treatments may be more profound, as against FDI which
is mostly in the secondary or tertiary sectors. Secondly, if tax incentives are not equally
offered to domestic investors, it may create a preference for foreign investors, and an
incentive for round-tripping – that is, local investors would transfer their capital abroad to
be returned as FDI. That notwithstanding, tax incentives may be designed to focus on the
attraction of FDI to diversify the export base. 46 However, the point is that tax incentives
should not be preferential in terms of their application – that is, exclusively focused on
attracting FDI.
However, in defining tax incentives, it is advisable that they are distinguished from
broader non-discriminatory fiscal incentives, such as general infrastructure development,
and the general legal regime for FDI and business, including investment guarantees. 47 The
latter are generally available to all enterprises, and are not intended to induce investment
in specific sectors or give an additional benefit to any particular investment. This is
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required so that tax incentives can be designed in a more coherent, simple, and transparent
manner to allow their objectives and impact to be easily assessable, so that they are not
subject to corruption and abuse.48
Also, it is appreciated that tax incentives can be looked at from two mirror sides –
from the perspective of tax authorities, and from that of investors. While tax
administrations, in tax expenditure analysis, may regard some tax concessions as tax
incentives, investors may see that in a different light. For instance, governments may
regard capital allowances and allowable depreciation schedules as tax incentives, but
investors may simply consider them as part of the normal treatment of business expenses,
and a basic characteristic of a conducive tax system. Investors may be inclined to regard
tax policies, such as tax holidays that waive the CIT, as a classic tax incentive. 49
Finally, the debate notwithstanding, what may be critical to determining if a fiscal
policy qualifies as a tax incentive may be the desired objective, and whether it constitutes
a treatment available to specific sectors, or it is just a general allowable treatment. For
example, accelerated depreciation allowed in a specific industry to encourage investment
in that sector, which is not available in other sectors, may qualify as a tax incentive.
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B. THE BASIC DESIGNS OF TAX INCENTIVES
The design of tax incentives will differ depending on the type of investment and
the quality of governance in the country concerned. 50 Six different tax incentives are
discussed in this section: tax holidays, accelerated depreciation, special size or scale tax
incentives, special sectors, and special regions or zones. 51

B.1. Tax holidays
Tax holidays are a profit-based incentive that consists of complete or limited
exemptions from tax obligations. With a tax holiday, new firms are allowed a period of
time during which the burden of income taxation is waived. 52 A tax holiday may take the
form of a complete exemption from profits tax (and other taxes), a reduced rate of tax or a
combination of the two. For example, a firm may be granted two years’ exemption from
taxation, plus a further three years at half the standard rate.53 Although tax holidays are to
encourage investment by reducing or eliminating the tax liability of firms over the holiday
period, they generally deny firms deductible expenses, such as, depreciation costs, and
interest tax deductions, to partly compensate for the loss in revenue resulting from the
exemption.
Tax holidays are used in many emerging countries because they are considered
simple to implement and easy to comply with. 54 By offering temporary tax relief to
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profitable firms, tax holidays benefit industries that start making profits in the early times
of the holiday period, providing benefits as soon as a company begins earning income,
compared to lower CIT rates whose advantages accrue over a longer period. Tax holidays
target total profits in the short-term, and tend to benefit short-term projects. However, tax
holidays may be to the advantage of readily mobile business activities which are least likely
to generate the desired multiplier effects compared to long-term investments.

B.2. Accelerated depreciation or capital allowance
Accelerated depreciation or capital allowance enables taxpayers to deduct the cost
of their expenses more quickly than they actually decline in value (permitting as a
consequence greater deductions earlier). These incentives can be designed as deductions
or credits. Tax deductions (allowances) reduce the taxable income of the firm (and
therefore turn on the tax rate faced by the firm); tax credits reduce the outstanding taxes to
be paid (and therefore are worth the same to taxpayers regardless of their tax rate).
Accelerated capital allowance are cost-targeted incentives which provide tax benefits over
and above the depreciation allowed for the asset.55 Investment allowances may apply to all
forms of capital investment, or may be limited to only plant and machinery, and be may
granted in addition to, or in place of the normal depreciation allowance.
The advantages with investment tax allowances is that they target the incentive at
the desired activity, are tied to current capital spending, and may result in lower revenue
foregone, than tax holidays. They also promote new investments, unlike a reduction in CIT
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rates, which benefits even owners of old capital. Tax payments in nominal terms are
unaffected, but their net present value is reduced and the liquidity of firms is improved.
A disadvantage with the use of investment allowances and credits is that it favours
capital intensive investment, and may not result employment creation, compared to tax
holidays. It may also create a preference for assets with a short lifetime to enable further
allowance, or credit to be claimed on replacement.

B.3. Special size or scale tax incentives
Special size or scale tax incentives grant investments with assets valued above a
threshold amount, or that create a minimum number of new jobs, a negotiated package of
tax incentives. They may be cost- or profit-based, and are suitable for countries or regions
that need major transformational investments, financial or technical ease ups in their
economies.56 In Ghana, for example, an investor making worth over USD 50 million of
investment in one of the key sectors, including, energy, infrastructure, and railways, can
negotiate tax concessions on import duties and other development costs. 57 One other
advantage of this approach is that, because it limits incentives to large investments, which
may be few, governments may be able to monitor their use at minimal cost.
A major disadvantage to the use of special size or scale incentives is that, because
of the element of discretion that may be involved in negotiating the incentives, they can be
manipulated, abused and distorted by bureaucrats to their own advantage. Furthermore,
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there is a high propensity to create uneven competition, and stifle the growth of smaller
firms which may not have access to such incentives, even when they are highly
productive.58

B.4. Special regions or zones, or special sectors
Special regions or zones, or special sectors, including designated cities or
administrative areas, may be granted favourable tax status in order to attract investment
into such locations or industries. Special sector incentives are applicable to sectors of the
economy considered most desirable and most likely to be influenced by tax. These tax
incentives may be offered to start-ups or infant industries.
The zones provide a discrete environment within which enterprises can import
machinery, components and raw materials free of customs duties and other taxes.
Production may be for export, and products sold on the domestic market treated as imports,
subject to appropriate import taxes. Import and export requirements within the zones may
be less stringent, and the zones may also be called customs-free zones, duty-free zones,
free trade zones, or SEZs.59 The major advantage of special zones is that they may be used
to address inequality in the geographical distribution of industries or development. On the
other hand, the main disadvantage of special zones is the propensity to displace investments
in other sectors of the economy. 60
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B.5. Import duty or tariff exemptions
Import duty or tariff exemptions can be used to reduce or eliminate tariffs on
imported capital equipment and spare parts for qualifying investment projects. Exemptions
from import duties and other taxes, such as tariffs, excises and VAT on imported inputs,
may be granted on imported goods, including plant and machinery, raw materials, and
special equipment, in manufacturing or natural resource extraction. The effect is to reduce
the cost of investment. On the other hand, increased tariffs can be charged on imported
competing products in order to protect the domestic market from competition. 61
The advantage of import duty or tariff exemptions schemes is that import duty relief
may be necessary to attract investment in capital intensive projects, such as, mining
investment, because it helps reduce cost of inputs, and other financial risks, considering
the substantial amount of capital investment that may be required in such projects.
Nevertheless, import duty exemptions come with some tax risks. Investors may increase
the cost of imported equipment and materials to reduce taxable income. Charging import
duties may reduce the incentive to inflate the cost of imported equipment and machinery,
granting a waiver.62

B.6. Reduced CIT rates
A reduced CIT rate may be set, as an exception to the general tax regime, in order
to attract FDI into specific sectors or regions. It may be targeted at foreign investment
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which meet specified criteria, or it may be granted to particular industries as a whole. 63 For
example, Kenya offers reduced CIT rate in the hospitality industry.

C. EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TAX INCENTIVES IN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Even though tax incentives are a popular policy tool for attracting FDI, evidence
on the effectiveness of tax incentives is not certain. Some studies have suggested that tax
incentives work across all jurisdictions; others suggest that tax incentives do not work at
all, no matter the jurisdiction; yet others claim that tax incentives work, but they are more
effective in developed countries than in developing countries. However, the final analysis
suggests that tax incentives work for certain kinds of investments, in certain situations, and
in certain sectors, across all jurisdictions. 64
In the mist of this debate, however, it has been observed that most countries,
irrespective of their stage of development, use tax incentives in order to attract FDI, making
tax incentives widespread and commonplace around the world. 65 High income countries
favour the use of investment tax credits, and allowances for research and development
(R&D), to promote export activities and achieve competitive advantage in the global
marketplace. Low-income countries more often provide tax holidays and reduced tax rates,
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in order to attract foreign investment and foster national industries.66 Middle-income
countries, on the other hand, offer preferential tax zones to fast-track industrialization.67
This section first considers evidence from developed countries, drawing on five
different studies, in 2017, 2008, 2000, 1994 and 1973. There are many available studies,
but for the purposes of this thesis, offering an illustrative sampling seems sufficient to
support the point that the evidence of effectiveness is mixed and turns on the unique
circumstances of the country and incentive.
The broad suggestion is that the types of tax incentives offered by developed
countries can be effective.68 For example, Dechezleprêtre et al (2017) conducted a study
on the causal impact of R&D tax incentives on innovation among UK firms. The evidence
indicated the existence of statistically and economically significant effects of tax policy
change on both R&D and firm level innovation, with large elasticities. The study also found
that R&D generated by tax policy had a positive spillover effects on the innovations on
related firms. 69
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Furthermore, in a cross-sectional time series study of the impact of fiscal incentives
in attracting FDI in 16 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2000-1990, Cleeve
(2008) found that tax incentives are an important determinant in the location of FDI in
advanced developed countries, especially in the location of US firms in other developed
countries. He also found that, of the fiscal incentives, tax holidays seem to have the most
significant impact on the location of FDI in these countries. 70 Moreover, Hall and Reenen
(2000), conducted a survey of the econometric evidence of the effectiveness of tax
incentives on research and development (R&D) in OECD countries between 1983 and
1997. The study concluded that a dollar in tax credit for R&D stimulates a dollar of
additional investment in R & D. 71
In addition, Swenson (1994) examined the impact of U.S. tax reform on FDI in the
United States, using the tax history for the 1980s. He found that increased taxes (in investor
home countries) spurred inward foreign investment in the U.S. He concluded that foreign
investor response is positively affected by lower taxes on assets in the U.S. relative to the
tax provisions faced by the foreign investor in his home country. 72
Finally, according to Hadari (1990), an empirical study conducted by World
Institute in Israel in 1973 found that tax incentives including grants, export incentives, and
the right to withdraw profits, significantly influenced investors to invest. 73 Thus, although
it has been suggested that the use of tax incentives has not been successful in attracting
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FDI in both developed and developing countries, it can be argued that tax incentives are
effective in developed countries.74
Although the evidence on the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI in
developing (medium- or low-income) countries varies, the general conclusion from the
review of the literature is that tax incentives are not effective in developing countries. 75
First, James (2013) in surveys of investors in developing countries, including Jordan,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Serbia analyzed the effect of tax incentives on private
investment in developing countries for the period 1997-2007.76 He found that although
exporters considered such incentives very important, most non-exporters do not rank
investment incentives among their top reasons for investing.
The study also suggests that tax incentives do not have as much effect on FDI in
developing countries as in developed countries, and that fiscal incentives do not effectively
counterbalance unattractive investment climate conditions, including poor infrastructure,
macroeconomic instability, and weak governance, in many developing countries. In his
conclusion, he suggested that the investment climate is more important than tax breaks or
other nontax incentives. 77
Secondly, Van Parys (2012) looked at evidence from developing countries on
effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting investment using data in over 40 Latin
American, Caribbean and African countries for the period 1985-2004. He found that the
CIT rate and tax holidays positively affect FDI in developing countries, but not robustly.
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He also observed that the impact of CIT rate and tax holiday was more significant in Latin
America and the Caribbean than in Africa. However, there was no evidence that investment
allowances affected FDI. The suggestion is that firms reward higher transparency and
security more than a lower tax burden, and that basic investment climate conditions (which
may be lacking) are key to investors, before tax incentives. 78
Thirdly, Zee et al (2002) reviewed the empirical literature on the effectiveness of
tax incentives in developing countries, including East Asian economies and transition
economies, such as Brazil, for the period 1984-2001. They found that the overall economic
characteristics of a country are more critical for the success or failure of FDI attraction
measures than any tax incentive package. They also found that even if tax incentives
stimulate investment, they are not generally cost-effective. The example was cited of Brazil
where the extensive use of incentives resulted in significant revenue losses (compared to
the investment generated) and distortions in the general tax system. 79
Fourthly, Biggs (2007) reported on a review of the fiscal regimes in twenty-one
countries, for the period 1994-2006, including CIT exemptions, tax holidays, investment
allowances, accelerated, depreciation, and tax credits, to attract technology-intensive FDI.
She concluded that CIT exemptions and tax holidays are not efficient in attracting
investment. She also found that developing countries use the wrong tax incentives, like tax
holidays and accelerated depreciation, which do not work in their economies. The
recommendation was that policy makers in developing countries should focus their tax
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incentives on small domestic corporate players (who may be more responsive to tax
incentives) than large TNCs which may be looking for other non-tax incentives in addition
to tax incentives.80
Country-specific empirical studies also show contradicting results. The
effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI remains unsettled, and their importance
differs with the jurisdiction of the study and the methodology. 81 Klemm and Van Parys
(2012) examined the impact of CIT tax holidays on investment in two monetary unions –
the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union and the African CFA Franc zone – for the period
1994-2006. The study found lower CIT rates and longer tax holidays are effective in
attracting FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean, but not in Africa. 82
Finally, while Kransdorff (2010), in a review of South Africa’s tax regime and its
potential to attract FDI, concluded that taxation can be important in attracting efficiencyseeking FDI in South Africa, Bolnick (2004), relying on data from the SADC Tax Database
in 2003, suggested that tax incentives are not enough to convince foreign investors to
choose their locations in the SADC region. 83 However, Kransdorff reckons that, even
though tax incentives are effective in attracting FDI, the low FDI flows in South Africa are
due to a poor investment climate.84 He suggested that in the short-term, offering more

80

See Phillippa Biggs, “Tax Incentives to Attract FDI” (2007) Meeting of Experts on “FDI, Technology and
Competitiveness” A conference convened in honour of Sanjaya Lall, UNCTAD, 2007 at 1.
81
However, even though tax incentives receive a lot of criticism, they continue to be used in most economies.
See Munongo, Akanbi & Robinson, supra note 67 at 152.
82
See Alexander Klemm & Stefan Van Parys, “Empirical evidence on the effects of tax incentives” (2012)
19 ITPF 393 at 1.
83
See Michael Kransdorff, “Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa” (2010) 3:1 TJSD
68-69 at 68. See also Bruce Bolnick, “Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC) Region” (2004) Report by Nathan-MSI Group to the SADC Tax
Subcommittee at XI. The study cites Mauritius, Costa Rica, Ireland and Malaysia as economies that have
successfully used non-tax incentives to attract FDI. These countries implemented successful economic
reforms, ensured political stability, educated their work-force, built good infrastructure and instituted
investment promotion agencies to increase their appeal to investors.
84
Ibid at 68.

34

competitive tax incentives could improve FDI flows, while South Africa works to better
the investment climate. Bolnick, on the other hand, concludes that non-tax elements of the
investment climate are far more important than tax incentives in determining the level and
quality of FDI. However, it would be difficult to rely on Kransdorff’s assertion for policy
reform purposes, because it lacks further empirical backing.
From the discussion so far, it can be seen that the evidence in developing and
transition countries on the effectiveness of tax incentives is not consistent with that of
developed countries. It appears that at a general level, tax incentives of the type offered by
developed countries have some effectiveness, but tax incentives of the type offered by
developing and transition economies are more likely to result in revenue sacrifice than
increased foreign direct investment.
The question then is, why do tax incentives work in developed countries, and not
in developing countries? It has been observed that tax incentives are ineffective in
promoting FDI in developing countries mainly because of the poor investment climates. In
many cases, developing countries lack high quality investment climate, basic
infrastructure, reasonable transport costs, and a policy framework favouring investment.
As a result, investors are unlikely to respond to even the most generous tax incentives. For
example, tax holidays cannot compensate for shortcomings in infrastructure, and may be
benefiting mainly firms that would have invested anyway.
Similarly, tax incentives may be ineffective in developing countries due to
economic or political challenges. For instance, most developing countries have inadequate
protection of property rights, rigid employment laws or a poorly functioning legal system.
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In such situations, it is more important to correct these deficiencies than to provide
investors with additional tax benefits. 85
Such a situation may be the case in Africa, particularly, sub-Saharan Africa. The
low effectiveness of tax incentives may be as a result of the fact that the investment climate
may be poor and granting tax incentives is insufficient to compensate for the poor climate.
The impact of the lack of transparency, security and accountability, coupled with the
complexity of the tax system is likely to cause investors to look elsewhere. 86 Perhaps
African developing countries can take a clue from the observation that tax incentives
cannot overcome fundamental problems that inhibit investment.87
Furthermore, tax incentives may not work in developing countries because they are
poorly designed, without proper economic and social assessment (such as, forecasts,
projections and externalities). For example, incentive programmes often include a specific
sunset provision as part of the original legislation; have long duration; do not require
beneficiaries to report to investment agencies; and may not specify which government
agency is responsible for monitoring, enforcement and evaluation. 88 In short, tax incentives
may not work in developing countries because of the poor investment climate and
inadequate design.
However, most emerging economies are still adopting new tax vehicles across all
sectors.89 Why do developing countries continue to grant tax incentives, in spite of the
ineffectiveness that may be associated with their use? Five main arguments have been
85
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advanced as the justification for this seeming anomaly in policy action – pressure to
counterbalance the poor investment climate, response to competitive pressures, lobbying
from TNCs, and reliance on successful examples.
Firstly, as indicated earlier, developing countries use tax incentives as a means to
counter the negative effects of a bad tax system. Tax incentives are also seen as
compensating measures for the effects of poor macroeconomics, inadequate infrastructure,
and lack of effective institutions. It may be easier for developing countries to grant tax
incentives than to provide, for instance, a secure and stable political environment; develop
a skilled workforce; or undertake reforms to correct deficiencies in the legal system,
improve the tax administration or upgrade the communications system. Also, discretionary
tax incentives generate more political influence, and can promote more corruption,
compared to other policy options.90
The justification may be that eliminating taxes, or reducing tax rates will help
mitigate losses associated with inefficiencies. 91 However, as mentioned earlier, granting
tax incentives may not be enough to compensate for poor investment climate and other
factors, like, political instability and intolerance. 92 There is the need to protect the revenue
base, and improve the investment climate. This can then be followed by the use of tax
incentives to become more FDI competitive. 93
Secondly, in addition to addressing market failures, tax competition is a major force
behind the grant of tax incentives in developing countries. Tax incentives are introduced
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by many transitional and developing countries because they are granted by neighbouring
countries. The aim may be to compete for investment that otherwise would have gone to
different regions or countries.94 Also, legislators may feel the need to do something to
attract investment, but may find it difficult to address the main factors that discourage
investment. In that case, tax incentives are policy options over which they have control,
and which they can enact relatively easily and quickly. 95 Closely related to the above is the
fact that many developing countries assume that investment is automatically attracted by
lowering the tax burden, but the costs related to tax incentives are often ignored; these costs
often outweigh the reduced tax burden. 96
Thirdly, developing countries may feel under pressure from TNCs, which threaten
to locate investment elsewhere if they are not granted tax concessions. 97 The effect of
lobbying by TNCs can be strong, especially where tax incentives can be granted on a
discretionary basis. 98 This lobbying may be driven by the profit motive of TNCs in seeking
to exploit natural resources or looking to take advantage of other favourable market
conditions.

It may also be facilitated by the rent-seeking opportunities of officials.

However, the effect on developing countries may be that they outcompete each other and
race to the bottom while TNCs gain.
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Fourthly, developing countries may prefer the use of tax incentives to alternatives
that may involve the expenditure of funds. Tax incentives do not require upfront use of
government funds, compared to other incentives, such as, grants or subsidized loans, which
are frequently employed in developed countries. 99 For example, subsidies may undergo
closer scrutiny, and so may not be easy to grant.100 The rationale may be to suffer a
temporary reduction in tax revenue associated with the grant of tax incentives, and focus
on expected benefit to offset the loss. 101
Finally, developing countries may be opting for tax incentives because the use of
fiscal incentives is familiar. The use of tax incentives to attract FDI has become a global
phenomenon from which developing countries do not wish to be left out. For instance, tax
incentives have been used in the history of developed countries, and they continue to be
used, to attract FDI. Also, developing countries may be spurred on, in the use of tax
incentives, by the success stories of recent successful users, including Ireland, Singapore
and China. 102 Developing countries may grant tax incentives in the hope of attracting FDI
commensurate with their own level of development.

D. MEASURES THAT COUNTRIES CAN ADOPT TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE USE
OF TAX INCENTIVES
Although, in many instances – particularly among developing countries – the
effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI has been questioned, it is believed that, if
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rightly designed and implemented, tax incentives can be a useful tool for attracting
investments that would otherwise not have been made.103 Six measures that must be given
due policy consideration in the design and use of tax incentives in order for them to achieve
the desired results objectives have been identified: clear objectives, consolidated
legislation, diligent record keeping, compliance conditions, limited duration, and improved
investment climate.104
Firstly, in order to design a desirable, appropriate and effective tax incentive
scheme, the objective must be clearly set forth, and the incentive programme crafted to
best fit the objective. In-depth analysis of the costs and benefits of tax incentives must be
carried out. This analysis should start by developing a realistic view of what can, and
cannot, be achieved.105 A framework for policy design and implementation is required,
which will identify the market imperfections which the incentives are intended to
address.106 Objectives must be compared with potential revenue loss, or other unintended
results associated with the use of the tax incentives. Also, the linkages between FDI
attraction and other policy objectives, and their effect, must be well established. If possible,
other more effective, cost-neutral measures must be considered. It should also be clear
which governmental body will be responsible for the formulation of policies, and which
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other authority may be involved in implementation process, for proper accountability. 107
Incentives should not be granted based on the bidding of investors.108
Secondly, an effective tax incentive scheme requires that they be clearly prescribed
and consolidated in legislation. An ideal tax system should keep tax laws as simple as
possible and aim for a global tax, with few exemptions or concessions. The pursuit of too
many social and economic goals must be avoided, and eligibility criteria for granting tax
incentives should be clearly defined and readily verifiable. The ultimate and sole authority
to enact tax incentives at the national level should be with the legislature – the Minister of
Finance and Economic Planning should be responsible for approving the grant of tax
incentives.109 Revenue administrations should only be in charge of the implementation and
enforcement of tax incentive schemes. Tax administrations should keep a balance between
tax stability for existing firms and equal treatment for new entrants into the market.110 Tax
incentives should be awarded with as little discretion and as much transparency as possible,
based on performance.
Thirdly, an effective tax incentive scheme requires proper record keeping, and
periodic tax reporting to ensure transparency and accountability. Tax incentive regimes
should require regular filing to allow for proper assessment of the success or otherwise.
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The choice of strategies and policy tools, the design and management of individual
programmes, and transparency of procedures for monitoring and evaluation, should be
under regular review. The potential costs of unsuccessful or poorly designed incentives
should inform the decision for subsequent schemes. Where desired results are not achieved,
authorities must be willing to terminate or modify the programme. 111
Fourthly, initial compliance with qualifying conditions must be clearly spelt out so
that it can be determined whether an investment meets the required standards. For example,
some incentive provisions may require initial approval or inter-agency decision making.
Tax authorities can request for some form of written certification to verify whether
stipulated local content, job creation thresholds or minimum capital requirements have
been met. Plant, machinery and equipment can be assessed to establish whether they
qualify, as advanced technology, for accelerated depreciation. 112 The agency responsible
for monitoring and enforcing, and the parties responsible for conducting the review must
be clearly identified.113
Fifthly, effective tax incentive schemes must have a limited duration, or must
contain a definite sunset provision, to allow for a regular evaluation of their continued
relevance. Also, including a sunset provision will also reduce the risk that tax incentives
are kept working due to administrative or political inertia. In determining the duration,
factors such as the political cycle and the time horizon for the development of a given
locality may be considered.
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Finally, effective tax incentive schemes must be complemented with an improved
investment climate. There is the need for developing countries to work at improving
domestic investment climates, and use tax incentives only to address market failures. 114
One other issue in the design and operation of tax incentives that may be worth
exploring is whether tax incentives should be generally applicable to both domestic and
foreign investors. While it is my view that tax incentives, in the general context, should be
designed to be of benefit to both domestic and foreign investors, in some particular
contexts, that may not be the objective. For example, where FDI tax incentive schemes
need to be distinguished from the general domestic tax system, tax incentives may be
construed to mean inducements that are not available to comparable domestic investors.115
But even where it is agreed that tax incentives are an inducement that constitutes a
deviation from the standard practice in an industry, it leaves much to be desired that tax
incentives should be construed to be applicable only to foreign investment. Granted that
where tax incentives grant special privileges to attract investments that are particularly
desirable, and, perhaps, would not be made without such tax treatments, it is my suggestion
that domestic investors must equally be treated.116
The equal treatment of domestic and foreign firms is required for four main reasons.
First, because both domestic and foreign investors are equally exposed to the general
investment climate, they are equally likely to feel the distortionary and other adverse
impacts of tax incentive policies. 117 General best practice discourages the use of special tax
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incentives because they distort investment decisions, are often ineffective, and are prone
to abuse and corruption. But, where for some reason it becomes necessary to introduce tax
incentives, they should be available to all investment that would meet the requirements.
For example, a reduced CIT rate across a broad base is a simpler approach that can be
applied to all domestic and foreign investors. This approach can be adopted to avoid
distortions associated with other forms tax incentives (such as, tax holidays), and relieve
the tax administration of tax-planning pressures.118
Additionally, because of their desirable outcome on business, tax incentives can
play a useful role in encouraging both domestic and foreign investment. The ultimate end
of tax incentives is a reduction in the effective tax rate, to guarantee higher after-tax return
on investment – that should be encouraging to both domestic and foreign investment. Also,
if disincentives, or unfavourable changes in domestic tax rules – such as, upward
adjustment in the CIT rate – are expected to be applicable to both domestic and foreign
investments, then, similarly, tax incentives should apply to both foreign and domestic
investors.119
Moreover, local investors are likely to venture into riskier sectors, long-term
investment, and primary sectors (with higher linkage effects), compared foreign
investors.120 Although studies show that foreign investors earn higher returns, and bring
greater efficiency to the market, due to superiority in terms of analytical skills and access
to information, 121 domestic investors may be more reliable, especially in times of adverse
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economic conditions.122 For instance, the majority of foreign investment may be footloose
investment – primarily short-term investments with smaller multiplier effects.123 Such
investments may quickly disappear, or be terminated, to relocate in another country, as
soon as tax benefits are exhausted.124 Moreover, limiting tax incentives to the foreign firms
may increase the risk of round-tripping – a situation where domestic investors channel
funds to special purpose entities abroad, and subsequently return them to local firms as
FDI.125
Fourth, tax incentives need not be preferential because both domestic and foreign
investments are motivated by profits, and the two can strongly complement each other.
Also, domestic investment may be a significant part the enabling environment for FDI to
thrive, and FDI may just be enhancing or maximizing some of the positive effects already
generated by local investment. For example, FDI might not create as many employment
opportunities as the domestic private sector, but FDI may generate higher paying jobs
commensurate with higher skills to shift the production frontier of the host economy. 126
Moreover, if well incentivized, domestic investment can equally generate some of the
advantages traditionally attributed to FDI. For instance, domestic investments usually
create more employment in a host country than FDI does.127
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In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed literature on the use of tax incentives to
attract FDI. It established that, generally, tax incentives constitute a favourable departure
from the general tax regime that is intended to induce investments in particular sectors of
the economy. Also, tax incentives may be used as tools to promote particular economic
goals, such as employment, correction of market inefficiencies, or reversal of a downturn.
Tax incentives come in several forms, including tax holidays, reduced CIT rates, and
import duty exemptions. It has also been found that tax incentives are used by both
developed and developing countries, however, they have been found more likely to work
in developed countries than in developing countries. Developing countries may continue
to use tax incentives because of existing competition, pressure from TNCs, the ease in the
use of tax incentives, or the examples of successful users.
Lastly, the use of tax incentives may be justified, given that, without government
intervention, the level of FDI can be suboptimal. 128 However, an effective tax incentive
scheme requires clear objectives; simple, concise and consolidated legislation; filing of tax
returns; and monitoring and evaluation.

Also, government decision-making process,

policies and administration must be transparent, and subject to scrutiny and evaluation.
Above all, it is recommended that the award and monitoring of tax incentives should be
guided by the rule of law, with clarity on eligibility criteria, and centralized administration.
Developing countries must focus on building a favourable investment climate, and ensure
transparency and accountability in the use of tax incentive policies.
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CHAPTER 3

TAX INCENTIVES FOR ATTRACTING FDI IN GHANA

This chapter discusses the tax incentives regime for the promotion, attraction and
facilitation of FDI in Ghana. It is divided into four main sections. It begins with a brief
overview of the regulatory framework for FDI and tax incentives, with a short discussion
of the GIPC Act, 2013 (Act 865),129 and tax policy adjustments under the ERP. The second
section reviews the history of efforts to attract FDI in Ghana from the period 1985-2017,
looking at the impact of various legislative reforms on FDI over the period. In the third
section, the main tax incentives for promoting FDI in Ghana are considered, including their
desired objectives, the authorizing legislation, and the administering body. It concludes
with an assessment of the effectiveness of tax incentives in Ghana, with a review of the
impact of tax incentives in the natural resource sector, and the operations of FZs.

A. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL REGIME OF INVESTMENT AND TAX
INCENTIVES IN GHANA
It is necessary that an overview of the general investment climate and the regulatory
framework for FDI in Ghana precede the analysis of Ghana’s tax incentives, since tax
incentives do not operate in a vacuum. Tax incentives operate within an investment climate
of a country, much of which is created by the state’s policy, vision and objectives. Thus
the investment climate, to a large extent, determines whether the tax incentives offered
would be effective, or not.
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The main FDI regulatory framework in Ghana is the GIPC Act.130 The Act codifies
into law the government's economic policy framework, which is aimed at attracting
investment into the private sector through a transparent FDI regulatory regime. It
guarantees against expropriation, and spells out incentives and procedures relating to
taxation, and the transfer of capital, profits and dividends.
Under the Act, the GIPC is the main administrative body to regulate all aspects of
FDI, except in minerals and mining, oil and gas, and FZs. The GIPC is also the government
agency that is to, among others, encourage and promote investments, and provide for the
creation of an attractive incentive framework, and a transparent, predictable and facilitating
environment for investments in Ghana.
The GIPC Act requires that all companies in which there is foreign participation
register with the GIPC. Registration occurs after each enterprise has been incorporated at
and licensed by the Registrar General’s Department. Also, business entities may be
required to register with other sector-specific regulatory bodies, based on the industry of
operation.
Ghana was among the first African countries to pursue economic liberalization,
overhauling its tax system in sweeping policy reforms in 1983. 131 A number of fiscal
incentives were introduced to encourage investment. Since then, successive legislative
reforms have offered further fiscal incentives, including the GIPC Act and the ITA of
2015.132 These pieces of legislation are replete with concessionary tax provisions, such as
130
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tax holidays, capital/investment allowances, locational incentives and customs duty
exemptions, tax credits, preferential/concessionary rates, and inducements and benefits,
intended to entice investors.133
Currently, many of the tax incentives are set out in the ITA, and are of general
application. 134 However, a number of them, which have a narrower focus and sector
specific application, are specified in statutes, such as, the GIPC Act, the FZA and the
Petroleum Act.135
Investors are guaranteed all the general tax incentives provided for under the law,
but special tax incentives may be available in particular sectors of the economy. 136 For
example, a CIT rate of 25 per cent applies to all sectors, except non-traditional exports and
oil and gas explorations;137 businesses in manufacturing and other key priority sectors can
carry forward losses, while other sectors cannot; and accelerated depreciation is allowed
mainly in the industrial sector, excluding banking, finance, commerce, insurance, mining
and petroleum. The tax provisions also allow the government to grant additional customs
duty exemptions and tax incentives beyond the minimum stated in the law to investments

133

See IMF, “Ghana Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility, Request for Waivers for
Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria” (2018) IMF
Country Report No. 18/113 at 5 [IMF 2018].
134
See ITA Ghana, supra note 19 at 1st, 3rd and 6th Schedule.
135
See GIPC Act 2013, supra note 19; FZA, supra note 19; Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act, 2016
(Act 919) (Ghana).
136
See ITA Ghana, supra note 19; Internal Revenue Act 2000 (Act 592) (Ghana); VATA, 2013 (Act 870)
(Ghana); Harmonized System: ECOWAS Common External Tariff and Other Schedules 2017(ECOWAS).
For example, while investors operating under the FZA are exempted from corporate tax for 10 years,
investors operating under the GIPC Act are not automatically entitled to tax holidays. There are also other
temporary tax holidays and location-based tax rebates for some sectors.
137
Income from the export of non-traditional goods is taxed at 8 per cent (reduced rate); and enterprises in
the petroleum sector can negotiate their CIT rate under the PITA, 1987. See the Petroleum Income Tax Law,
1987 (P.N.D.C.L. 188) (Ghana).

49

of strategic national interest.138 There is, however, much skepticism about the level of
monitoring, and it is unclear whether data on the entire range of negotiated incentives
granted is kept and used for tax reporting purposes.139

B. HISTORY OF EFFORTS TO ATTRACT FDI IN GHANA, 1985-2017
This section considers the evidence of tax incentives on investment in Ghana from
1985 to 2017. It offers an outline of the effects of series of legislative reforms on FDI in
Ghana, starting from the introduction of the ERP in 1983, continuing to the period of global
decline of FDI in 2001. It also looks at the rise in FDI in 2017, and ends by projecting from
thence into the medium term.
The effects of FDI in Ghana have been undulating. Although the history of FDI
dates back several centuries, with early foreign establishments, 140 in more recent times
(1970s), FDI had mainly been in import-substitution manufacturing, underpinned by
policies to complement income from traditional exports – cocoa, timber and gold. 141 This
situation necessitated the adoption of new initiatives to open the country to attract
investment in the manufacturing sector.142
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In 1983, Ghana introduced the ERP, which saw the country undertake a transition
from a state-controlled economy to a market economy. 143 As a developing country with
significant FDI flows to the mining (gold) sector, Ghana adopted three main fiscal changes
affecting the sector, in a new mining law in 1986.144 Minimum royalties were reduced from
6 per cent to 3 per cent; CIT from 55 per cent to 35 per cent; and tax exemptions were
granted for imported plant and equipment.145 The country also embarked on a privatization
programme as part of the reforms. 146
The new mining law enacted in 1986 sent a positive signal among investors,
resulting in a sudden rise in investments. 147 Soon FDI revamped, and for the period 19911995, Ghana was considered a prime investment destination, ranking among the top 10
countries in Africa. FDI soared from a yearly average of USD 19 million during the period
1980-1993 to USD 128 million in 1994-2002, and gross capital formation rose from 10 to
22 per cent of GDP.148 This spectacular performance was credited to the adoption of new
policies under the ERP. The divestiture programme, which involved the privatization of
unprofitable state enterprises, started in 1988, also contributed to this relative success. 149
FDI inflows peaked in 1994 with the partial sale of AGC to the South African giant,
Lonmin. 150 The acquisition, which also saw FDI flowing to the services sector, brought the
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country to the limelight for international investment. The privatization of AGC by the
government was also to signal its preparedness to encourage foreign participation in the
private sector of the economy.
In order to further boost FDI inflows, an Investment Centre was established, under
the Investment Code, in 1994,151 in line with the country’s development strategy
framework. Hailed as the best in Africa at the time, the Code 152 eliminated entry barriers,
eased requirements for enterprise establishment and provided incentives and guarantees to
investors. The Gateway strategy was launched alongside, with the objective of developing
the country into a regional investment centre, by removing the constraints to exports, and
attracting export-oriented firms and investment.
The period 1996-2000, however, saw FDI inflows decline, with the economy
subsequently suffering a shock in the period 1998-1999, due to the fall in prices of its major
exports, and the rise in the price of its major import, oil. 153
In an effort to resuscitate investor interest, a new phase of the divestiture process
was launched in 1998. 154 The policy, under which foreign investors were reassured of
government’s commitment to business, helped stabilize the economy, and FDI inflows
recovered in 2000. But the worldwide decline of FDI in 2001 caused inflows to Ghana to
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decelerate, as in many other developing countries. FDI inflows in 2002 fell to a record low
of USD 60 million.155
Nonetheless, the government, was determined to shore up the gains made thus far.
Critical domestic strategies, such as enhancing the regulatory framework governing
privatization, improving good governance, reviving the Gateway Strategy, and committing
to regional integration, were adopted to reposition the country among the top investment
destinations in Africa. Through policy revision, adoption of new strategies and the
provision of guarantees and protection to investment, the country staged a comeback in
2008, with FDI hitting a high at USD 2,710 million.156 The country continued this progress
in attracting capital and technology for development, and in 2016, FDI reached its peak at
USD 3,490 million, falling off slightly to USD 3,250, in 2017. 157
Projecting forward, from 2018, there is still room for Ghana to sustain its FDI trend
to further rake in the benefits that rising inflows could bring. 158 This underscores the need
for the government to further enhance the attractiveness of the country and instil confidence
among investors, through the adoption of institutional and legal frameworks, holding of
stakeholder forums, and promotional campaigns.
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C. TAX INCENTIVE FRAMEWORK IN GHANA
In this section, we discuss the main legal framework on tax incentives available in
Ghana, including, the ITA, 2015 (Act 896), the GIPC Act, 2013 (Act 865), the FZA, 1995
(Act 405), the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703), Minerals and the Mining Act,
2010 (Act 794).159 Although these are the main pieces of legislation regulating investment
activities in the private sector, others that may be required in discussing specific tax
incentives will be cited under the appropriate incentive category.
It is worth noting that the operation of tax incentives in Ghana is automatic, as set
out in the tax provisions, except in a few specific cases where administrative intervention
is required. These major tax incentives are discussed under five broad headings, in the order
as follows: tax exemptions and tax amnesty, general reduction in the CIT rates, targeted
reduction in the effective CIT rate, DTA, and import duty exemptions.

C.1. Tax Exemptions and Tax Amnesty
Ghana offers tax exemptions as schemes that grant certain categories of investment
the right to pay no taxes for a limited or an unlimited period of time. Under this category,
two main schemes operated are discussed: the FZs scheme, aimed at enhancing the
industrial capacity of the country, and the tax amnesty provision, the first to be offered in
the last seven years. 160
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Firstly, the GoG enacted the FZA for the purpose of promoting economic
development in Ghana, and positioning the country as the gateway, from whence investors
can expand their operations to neighbouring emerging markets in West Africa and beyond.
The FZs are to be utilized as production centres for manufacturing and value addition, and
also as hubs for growing and developing the industrial sector in the country. 161 Goods and
services produced under this programme are mainly for export, although domestic sales
may be allowed under limited circumstances.
Also, FZEs are exempted from paying CIT for the first ten years of operation. In
addition, after the ten year tax holiday, an FZE is entitled to a reduced CIT rate for up to
ten years. FZEs are charged a concessionary rate of 15 per cent CIT on export of goods
and services outside the national customs territory, and 25 per cent on all domestic sales.162
Also, under the Act, the imports of FZEs are exempt from the payment of all indirect taxes
and duties, and shareholders are exempted from the payment of withholding taxes on
dividends arising out of FZ investments. Moreover, under the scheme, any area of land or
building may be declared a FZ, and any port a free port. Only corporate bodies may be
licensed by the Authority to develop and/or manage or operate under a FZ. FZEs are also
guaranteed free transfer of dividends, profits, loan payments, fees and charges, and
remittance of proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation.163 The scheme is administered
by the GFZB in collaboration with the GRA.164
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Secondly, the Tax Amnesty Act, 2017 offers a special incentive to existing tax
defaulters to regularize their obligations under the law. 165 Under this initiative, persons
who had failed to register or file their tax returns with the GRA, or pay their taxes as
required, are granted amnesty to do so. The strategy is to encourage a voluntary compliance
culture, broaden the tax base, as well as update the database. 166 It is also part of
government’s programme to streamline regulation in the private sector in order to
accelerate growth.
In this regard, amnesty is offered on outstanding taxes, penalties and interest from
previous years through to 2017. Taxpayers who would register and file their taxes for the
years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017, on or before September 30, 2018 would be exempted
from paying penalties and interest, and from prosecution. This exemption applies to
persons who have not been registered with the GRA, or have not submitted returns, or are
in arrears. It does not, however, apply to persons who have been assessed, or are under an
audit or investigation in respect of unpaid tax liabilities, or have been notified of an
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enforcement action in relation tax compliance.167 It does not also apply to payments and
returns due from 1st January 2018. 168 After the amnesty period, GRA will intensify
campaigns to prosecute continuing defaulters. 169

C.2. General CIT rates reduced
Although the general CIT rate in Ghana is 25 per cent, attractive tax structures that
provide for lower CIT rates in particular sectors, types of firms and activities are granted
to ensure higher after-tax profit. These incentive schemes, which range from geographical
or locational incentives to livestock production, are operated mainly under the ITA.
Concessionary CIT rates are assigned to specific sectors to encourage investment in those
sectors.
To begin with, the manufacturing sector is one of the main beneficiaries of this
scheme. The aim is to promote industrialization and ensure the even spread of development
across the country. Under the ITA, companies in manufacturing are entitled to
concessionary tax rates, based on their geographical location in the country. Manufacturing
companies located in the regional capitals (the equivalent of provincial capitals) are entitled
to a 25 per cent rebate on the general CIT. This is equivalent to 75 per cent of the standard
CIT, or an effective CIT of 18.7 per cent. However, manufacturing companies located in
Accra (the national capital), and the major industrial city of Tema pay the standard CIT of
25 per cent. Further, manufacturing business located elsewhere in Ghana, but not in a
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regional capital, or Accra and Tema, are entitled to a 50 per cent reduction on the standard
CIT, which equals an effective CIT rate of 12.5 per cent. As mentioned earlier,
manufacturing businesses located in a FZ enclave are entitled to a concessionary rate of 15
per cent CIT on export of goods and services, and 25 per cent on domestic sales, after the
10 years tax holiday period. These incentives are administered by the GRA. 170
Moreover, in order to curb post-harvest losses in the local fishing industry, and
diversify the export base of the economy, agro-processing and cocoa by-product businesses
operating wholly in Ghana are offered a reduced CIT rate of 1 per cent for the first 5 years
of operation. After the tax holidays, agro-processing enterprises which use local
agricultural raw materials as their main input have their CIT rates fixed in accordance with
their location, as follows: Accra-Tema, 20 per cent; other regional capitals (except the three
northern regions), 15 per cent; outside regional capitals, 10 per cent; and the three northern
regions (including capitals and all other locations), 5 per cent. Also, income from nontraditional exports is taxed at a concessionary rate of 8 per cent for the first 5 years. 171 The
administering authority is the GRA. 172
Furthermore, in order to promote a responsible and well regulated utilization of
forestry and wildlife in Ghana, and to ensure that such resources are conserved and
managed in a sustainable manner, tree crop, cash crop, and livestock farming have been
granted concessionary CIT rates. The GRA, under the ITA, grants tree crop farming, and
170
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enterprises in cash crop, or livestock production (excluding cattle) a reduced CIT rate of 1
per cent for the first 5 years of operation. 173
Additionally, as part of measures to make Ghana a financial hub in West Africa,
tax policies have been adopted to boost activity on the GSE, increase investor confidence,
and promote favourable investment in the financial sector as a whole. Under the ITA,
companies listed on the GSE are offered a reduced CIT rate of 22 per cent; and rural
banking businesses and VCFCs are each entitled to a reduced CIT rate of 1 per cent for the
first 10 years of their operations. 174 The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2017175 allows
non-resident investors to invest on the GSE with no limits or prior exchange control
approval. Moreover, losses from disposal of shares or any investment made during the
incentive period may be carried forward, for a period exceeding the 10 years exemption,
for up to 5 years. 176 Capital and all associated earnings can be fully remitted in foreign
exchange, and net gains from securities traded on the GSE are exempt from tax through to
the fiscal year 2021.177 Also, financial institutions granting loans to leasing companies,
and farming enterprises are entitled to 20 per cent CIT rate. There is, however, 8 per cent
WHT (final tax on dividend income) for all investors, both resident and non-resident, and
the administrative authority is the GRA. 178
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Also, the GoG recognizes real estate as an emerging sector that can contribute
significantly to the development of the economy to meet the increasing housing needs of
Ghanaians. In order to promote the growth and development of this sector, and to
encourage public and private sector participation in housing investment and delivery in
Ghana, tax incentives are granted to registered housing schemes. 179 The GRA, under the
ITA, exempts the incomes of REITs, including approved unit trust schemes, and mutual
funds, and the interest or dividend paid to a member or a holder of an approved unit trust
or mutual fund from tax.180 Also, low-cost residential housing enterprises are entitled to a
reduced CIT rate of 1 per cent for the first 5 years, and waste processing businesses, 1 per
cent up to the first 7 years of operation. There is a requirement, however, that the housing
project be approved by Minister for Works and Housing.
Further, in order to develop sustainable tourism and creative arts, and to ensure an
enabling environment for public-private-partnership in resource mobilization and
investment in the tourism sector for accelerated national development, companies in the
hotel or hospitality industry are offered a reduced CIT rate of 22 per cent. The
administering body of the scheme is the GRA. 181
Likewise, the GoG acknowledges the need for mining investment under a win-win
value proposition.182 In order to make Ghana the leading destination of mining sector
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investment in Africa, and to promote the effective utilization of the mineral resources of
Ghana in a safe environment for sustainable development, the sector is granted some tax
concessions. Although the general CIT rate applicable in this sector is 35 per cent, under
the Minerals Commission Act, 1993 and the ITA, companies operating in the minerals
sector can negotiate the CIT rate to be paid. Additionally, the GRA allows companies that
have stability or investment agreement with the GoG to be eligible to the reduced rate as
set out under the agreement.183 However, the operations of such firms are strictly subject
to written agreement ratified by parliament, and an approved investment agreement may
contain a clause that allows GoG to freeze or reduce the tax rate.

C.3. Targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate
This section discusses incentive schemes aimed at reducing the effective CIT rate,
including accelerated depreciation, interest expense deductions, special treatment of capital
gains and losses, loss carry forward in some given sectors, special initiatives, and rules for
strategic major investment projects. These are different from the schemes considered under
the general CIT-reducing category above, because they are not a direct reduction in the
CIT rate, but operate by reducing the cost of production and thereby lessening the tax
burden of affected businesses.
First of all, under the ITA, accelerated capital allowance deductions, prescribed at
statutory rates, are granted to replace enterprise-specific depreciation deductions, which
are disallowed. Deductions may be computed on a reducing-balance basis, for the
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following assets classes, at the following rates: class one asset pool, including computers,
data handling equipment and accessories, 40 per cent; class two asset pool, including plant
and machinery, and automobiles, 30 per cent; and class three asset pool, including
locomotives and accessories, water transportation equipment, aircraft, public utility plant
and equipment, and office equipment and fixtures, 20 per cent. Deductions may be
computed using the straight-line method, as follows: class four assets, such as, buildings
and permanent structures, 10 per cent; class five assets, such as, intangibles, useful life;
mining and petroleum expenditure, 20 per cent; and machinery and equipment to affix
excise tax stamps, 50 per cent.184
Furthermore, under the ITA, interest expense is deductible, but deduction of
financial costs is limited. Interest incurred on financing used in generating the income of
an enterprise can be deducted. However, other financial costs, apart from interest, are
limited to the sum of financial gains derived from the investment, and fifty per cent of the
income, excluding financial gains or financial costs incurred. 185 Making interest deductible
is to encourage investment in capital intensive sectors such as the extractive industry and
manufacturing.
In addition, under the ITA, gains on disposal of assets, as reported in financial
statements, are not taxable, and losses on disposal of assets, as reported in financial
statements, are not allowable. Gains are deducted from profits, and losses added to profits.
This is in line with provisions in the ITA that do not recognize enterprise-specific
depreciation policies; largely because the classification system adopted by the ITA for
capital allowance deductions is such that it is very difficult to determine whether a loss or
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gain is realised on the sale of an asset. The cost of fixed assets disposed of may, however,
be deducted.186
Moreover, although Ghana does not allow tax losses to be carry over, as an
incentive, seven key priority sectors are allowed to carry forward their losses for five years.
These include, farming, petroleum, mining, and agro-processing, ICT, manufacturing, and
tourism. For a manufacturing business to qualify under this scheme, it should be exporting
more than 50 per cent of its output. There are transition provisions that enable companies
with development and stability agreements, and firms operating in the petroleum sector,
which were allowed to carry forward losses indefinitely, under the PITA, 1987,187 to
continue to do so, even though the ITA now limits the period to 5 years. The administering
agency is the GRA.
Also, for the purpose of promoting identified strategic or major investments in key
sectors of the economy, provision has been made under the GIPC Act to grant strategic
investors the right to negotiate tax incentives. A strategic investment is an investment in a
priority area determined by the government. Currently, an investor making over USD 50
million worth of investment can negotiate tax concessions on import duties and other
development costs. Key priority areas that have been identified under this scheme include
energy, infrastructure, roads, railways, ports, property development, agriculture/agribusiness, manufacturing, oil and gas services, tourism services, ICT, education and
financial. However, the designated sectors, and the qualifying threshold value of
investment, of USD 50 million, are subject to change, to be determined from time to time
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by the development policy of the GoG. The administering authority is the GIPC in
collaboration with the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. 188
Finally, two special initiatives – the 1D1FP, and the YEP – have been launched to
incentivize the private sector. The 1D1F is the GoG’s flagship incentive programme for
the manufacturing sector. As part of the GSGDA II, the 1D1F is aimed at improving private
sector productivity, and the competitiveness of MSMEs. It is also targeted at attracting
private capital, expanding market access, and ensuring rapid industrialization through
agriculture and the use of other natural resources. In addition to the tax exemptions that
may be negotiated, under the programme, the GoG provides direct financial support, and
other interventions, such as assistance in securing land, access to utilities, as may be
appropriate. This scheme is administered by the MOTI.189
On the other hand, the YEP is to provide support for start-ups, and SMMEs founded
by young entrepreneurs, under the age of 35 years. It grants reduced CIT rates, and allows
loss carry forward.

Its primary focus is to offer assistance, in terms of business

development services, start-up incubation and funding, for new business initiatives to grow
and be successful.
Under the programme, entrepreneurs, under the age of 35 years, in manufacturing,
information and communications technology, agro processing, energy, waste processing,
tourism and creative arts, horticulture and medicinal plants, can negotiate tax incentives
for their businesses. After the negotiated incentive period has elapsed, they are granted
reduced CIT rates for five years, based on the location, as follows: Accra and Tema, 15 per
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cent; other regional capitals (outside the three northern regions), 12.5 per cent; outside
other regional capitals, 10 per cent; and the three northern regions, 5 per cent. The
programme, which is administered by the NEIP, also allows eligible businesses to carry
forward losses for 5 years. 190

C.4. DTAs
This section discusses DTAs – international tax treaties to ensure relief from the
multiple taxation of incomes of entities in any of the tax jurisdictions under the treaty. The
tax policy in Ghana is geared toward providing relief from double taxation to encourage
international trade. Through DTAs, taxing rights are designed to provide reduced tax rates
for non-resident individuals as an incentive for investors from global tax sourced
jurisdictions. The objective is to free investment capital and prevent base erosion. For
example, income from shipping and air transport operations in international traffic is
taxable only in the place of effective management of the enterprise.
Provision for DTA is made under the GIPC Act, and covers taxes related to income
and capital gains. Ghana has signed DTAs with France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
South Africa, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark, and is yet to
ratify the DTAs signed with the Czech Republic, Singapore and Mauritius. The agreements
are regulated by GIPC, and allow for foreign income tax paid with respect to the income
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derived from outside Ghana to be deducted.191 The rates applicable under DTAs in force
in Ghana are provided in Table 1.192
Also, under the ITA, a resident person is entitled to a credit for foreign income tax
paid, which is not above the average rate of Ghanaian income tax of that person. A person’s
assessable income, for which a foreign tax credit may apply, would be increased by the
amount of the credit, and where taxable foreign income includes a dividend, tax is deemed
to have been paid on the dividend. Foreign tax credits are administered by the GRA. 193
However, the tax treatment of dividends and interest in Ghana varies slightly from
that allowed under the OECDMTC.194 The OECDMTC rules out the extra-territorial
taxation of dividends and interest realised through a PE. The taxing rights of States in
which PEs are situated is restricted under Articles 10 and 11, in combination with Article
7. These provisions ensure that dividends and interest are not subjected to double taxation
since the interest and dividends are already taxable (in accordance with the provision under
Article 7) as part of the profits attributable to the PE.195 However, the OECDMTC allows
dividends and interest (other than that attributable to a PE) paid by a resident entity to a
non-resident entity to be taxed by the resident state. The OECDMTC also provides that the
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rate at which dividends may be taxed by a resident contracting state shall not exceed 15
per cent, and that for interest should not exceed 10 per cent.196
On the other hand, the Ghanaian tax system treats dividends and interest paid by a
resident entity, including PEs, as payments sourced from Ghana, and are, therefore, subject
to tax. Also, where the debt obligation giving rise to the interest is secured by real property
situated in Ghana, the interest is deemed as sourced from Ghana, and is liable to tax in
Ghana. However, the rate at which dividends on income sourced in Ghana are taxed is
consistent with the OCDMTC provisions, which provides for dividends to be taxed
between 5 and 15 per cent.197 With regard to interest, the upper limit at which Ghana taxes
interest exceeds that provided under the OECDMT. Ghana taxes interest paid to nonresident persons between 7 and 12.5 per cent.198 Thus, the upper limit of 12.5 per cent
exceeds the OECD Model’s provision of 10 per cent by 2.5 percentage points.199
Therefore, unlike as provided for under the OECDMT, dividends and interest of
PEs are treated as income of a resident entity, and are subject to tax in Ghana. Also, the
income and liability of a PE are treated as if the PE is a different entity from its owner, but
business arrangements between the two entities are given due consideration. Moreover, the
net profit of a branch is deemed as repatriated profits, and is subject to a final WHT of 8
per cent. WHT rates for payments to non-resident persons are provided in Table 2.200
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C.5. Import duty exemptions / reduced excise duty
This section considers waiver of taxes, such as, tariffs, excises and VAT, on
imported plant and machinery, collected at the borders and/or the ports, to reduce the cost
of inputs and thereby encourage manufacturing and production. Generally, industrial and
agricultural plant, machinery or equipment, or parts imported for investment purposes are
duty exempt under the Customs Act, 2015, but investors can apply for exemptions for
specific machinery which are not exempt. Under this category, four major schemes have
been identified, and are discussed, in the order as follows: first, general plant, machinery,
equipment and parts; second, mining equipment and machinery; third, local raw material
for the production of malt drinks, stout beer and cider beer; and, fourth, forestry developers.
First of all, under the GIPC Act, an enterprise may apply for its plant, machinery,
equipment or parts not exempted to be exempted from import duties and related charges.
If the GIPC determines that the machinery or parts will promote the establishment and
operation of the enterprise, and facilitate changes in technology, it shall recommend the
application to the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning for approval. These
exemptions are solely based on the provisions of the GIPC Act and are administered by the
GIPC.201
Secondly, mining equipment and machinery are also eligible for import duty
exemptions. Under the Minerals and Mining Act 2006, mining companies registered with
the Minerals Commission may be exempted from import duties on mining equipment and
machinery. The classification of equipment eligible for the exemption is contained in the
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mining list, which may be reviewed and updated periodically by the GRA together with
the Ghana Chamber of Mines. Mineral rights are granted by the Minister of Lands and
Natural Resources to companies registered with the Ghana Chamber of Mines. 202
Thirdly, producers of malt drinks, stout beer and cider beer who use local raw
material for production are offered concessionary rates, under the Excise Duty Act of
2015.203 The Act provides favourably reviewed rates of duty payable on excisable goods
used as raw materials for the production of beverages. In the production of malt drinks,
where less than 50 per cent of the raw materials is sourced locally, an excise duty of 17.5
per cent of the ex-factory price is charged; where the proportion is between 50 and 70 per
cent, a rate of 10 per cent is applicable; and where it is above 70 per cent, a rate of 7.5 per
cent is applicable. In the production of stout beer, where less than 50 per cent of raw
material is sourced locally, a rate of 47.5 per cent applies; where the proportion is between
50 and 70 per cent, a rate of 32.5 per cent applies; and where it is above 70 per cent, a rate
of 10 per cent applies. In the production of production of cider beer, the rate of excise duty
payable for locally sourced raw material is fixed at 17.5 per cent. The administering
institution is the GRA. 204
Finally, forestry developers receive a favourable tax treatment for imported
machinery, under the Timber Resources Management (Amendment) Act, 2002. Forest
plantations and wildlife developers can apply for import duties, VAT or excise taxes on
their plant, machinery and equipment to be exempted. They are also entitled to special
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income tax concessions, which can be negotiated with the Forestry Commission. The
awarding institution is the Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines. 205

D. EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN GHANA
This section discusses the impact of tax incentives on tax revenue in Ghana, and
argues that the impact has not been desirable. It looks at two main sectors, the mining
industry and the FZs for the period 2008-15, drawing on two major studies – one conducted
by Actionaid International in 2015, and the other Prichard and Bentum (2009). 206
To begin with, there are strong indications to the effect that the tax incentive regime
in Ghana has been damaging to the overall welfare of the country. Although some
econometric models207 indicate that tax havens in Ghana have had some positive effect on
GDP, much of the evidence points to the contrary. Even where tax incentives have been
successful in stimulating growth in GDP, their adverse impact on domestic tax revenue has
been heavier. Analysis of the tax incentive regime between 2008 and 2013 indicates that
tax incentives accounted for a loss (tax expenditure) of about 14.18 per cent to 41.20 per
cent of total tax revenue, about 1.80 per cent to 5.31 per cent of the GDP of Ghana. 208
Also, it has been found that tax incentives significantly reduce domestic revenue
collection, and are not needed to attract FDI. It is estimated that annual tax revenue loss in
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Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal is about USD 5.8 billion.209 In Ghana alone, revenue loss
associated with tax exemptions, including corporate tax holidays and special regimes, is
estimated to be USD 2.27 billion a year, an average of 6 percentage of total GDP. In 2008,
corporate tax incentives ranged from 1.8 per cent to 5.31 per cent of GDP.210
Moreover, in the period 2011-13, annual revenue loss associated with tax incentives
in Ghana was between USD 299 million and USD 1.23 billion, with an average of USD
693 million.211 This average is approximately three times the allocation to the health
sector, and could be spent on improving public service delivery in sectors including, health,
education and infrastructure, to create a more attractive investment climate. 212
Likewise, in the natural resource sector, despite the fact that mineral policy reforms
in Ghana have contributed to a significant increase in investment in the sector, and an
upsurge in gold production, and external earnings, taxing the sector has been a great
challenge.213 Various tax incentives are granted in this sector, but the wealth generated has
not been of benefit to the national economy and the communities around the mines. Like
many developing countries, the economy is still characterised by high budget deficits,
rising debt-to-GDP ratios, and trade deficits; and the livelihood of people in mining
communities has not seen much improvement. Annual revenue loss associated with tax
incentives granted in this sector is estimated at USD 1.2 billion. Between 2008 and 2015,
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estimated annual average revenue loss (tax expenditures) due to tax incentives to the
mining sector was 2.01 per cent of total GDP.214
Furthermore, in addition to the perennial huge annual tax revenue losses, the impact
in respect of the damage caused to the environment, and the displacement of people in
towns and villages have also been a cause for concern. Some of the negatives associated
with this sector include environmental degradation, resulting in loss of farmlands,
destruction of crops and vegetation, pollution of water bodies, and noise, vibration and air
pollution associated with blasting. The outcome in most instances have been outbreaks of
disease, and economic deprivation.215
Additionally, in the industrial sector, there is a general perception, and instances of
malpractices in respect of the operation of FZEs. There have been reports of abuse of the
tax incentives granted FZEs, estimated between 9 and 12 per cent of total tax revenue from
the sector. A significant number of FZ firms had been in active operation, and making
profits in Ghana prior to the creation of the FZs regime. Although conversion to FZ status
may have been occasioned by additional investment, it is probable that all these firms have
ceased paying taxes. Also, some FZEs use dubious schemes, such as, change in ownership,
in some instances, between related business interests, to extend or access new tax
incentives. Others also engage in activities that make them less eligible for being FZEs,
such as, the importation of finished products, or consumer goods; and others use goods for
purposes other than those for which exemptions were granted, including the import of raw
materials onto the local market.216
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Worst of all, there are no serious monitoring and evaluation processes for the
various tax incentives offered in FZs. Overall monitoring capacity is limited, and only a
few systematic studies of revenue impact are available. In both sectors, the way forward is
to determine whether the revenue loss is commensurate with the benefits of new investment
envisaged to be made. There is also the need for transparency, controls in revenue streams
to prevent corruption, and measures to set and enforce environmental standards, alongside
the need to protect the rights of indigenous people, and to fund capacity-building for
monitoring.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the real FDI attraction advantage for Ghana may
not be in just granting tax incentives to transnational corporations. It may have to minimize
the use of tax incentives, and focus on and creating an enabling investment environment
through measures, such as, good governance, the rule of law, prudent macroeconomic
management, and investment in infrastructure and training. Perhaps, these, coupled with
tax incentive schemes may be enough to attract investment to the desired levels. 217
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CHAPTER 4

TAX INCENTIVES FOR ATTRACTING FDI IN KENYA

This chapter discusses the tax incentive regime for the promotion, attraction and
facilitation of FDI in Kenya. It is in four parts. It begins with a brief overview of the legal
framework or the regulatory regime of investment in the country, focusing mainly on the
IPA, 2004, and the roles and responsibilities of the KIA established under the Act, as the
lead institution in the promotion and facilitation of investment in Kenya. 218
The second part discusses the history of efforts to attract FDI in Kenya for the
period 1963-2017. It looks at the high volatilities of FDI flows in Kenya attributable to
series of policy reforms, starting from the high periods of early independence in 1963,
through the lows of the 1980s – the beginning of the SAPs, to the recovery period of 2004,
with the enactment of the IPA, and the subsequent establishment of the KIA.219 It concludes
by projecting that a growing trend in FDI is expected for the short-term period 2017‑20,
given improvement in the investment climate.
In the third part, the framework of tax incentives is discussed, including tax
exemptions and tax amnesty, reduction in the CIT rates, targeted reduction in the effective
CIT rate, DTA, and import duty exemptions / reduced excise duty. These constitute the
major incentive schemes employed under various pieces of legislation, such as the IPA,
the EPA and the ITA, in order to entice investors and induce investment in keys priority
sectors of the economy. 220
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The chapter concludes by assessing the potential effectiveness of the tax incentives
offered in Kenya. Drawing on three different studies by the Institute of Economic Affairs,
Kenya, (2012); Tax Justice Network-Africa and ActionAid International (2012); and
Mutua and Muya (2013), it argues that, as in many other developing African countries, tax
incentives have not had the desired impact on the Kenyan economy – they result more in
revenue leakage than in inducing investment. 221 It further suggests that the Kenyan
government focus on improving the investment fundamentals, and maximizing efficient
tax collection rather than offering tax incentives.

A. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL REGIME OF INVESTMENT AND TAX
INCENTIVES IN KENYA
The major legislation for regulating and promoting FDI in Kenya is the IPA,
2004.222 Under the IPA, the KIA was established as the lead institution in the promotion
and facilitation of investment in Kenya. The KIA is also responsible for advocating for a
conducive investment climate, providing accurate information, and offering quality
services, such as, obtaining all the necessary licenses for investors, and implementing new
investment projects. Moreover, the KIA assists in the grant of incentives to investors and
advises the government on measures to increase the ease of doing business and attracting
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FDI.223 Furthermore, the KIA provides information on investment opportunities and
sources of capital, and is responsible for organizing both local and international investment
promotion activities. 224
In addition, as the main government body responsible for facilitating investment,
the KIA aims to reduce bureaucratic delays in the licensing of investors, and in the grant
of tax incentives and exemptions from the relevant authorities. It is also to ensure minimal
government interference, as an active market participant, in the private sector through
effective regulation. 225
Also under the IPA, after a business is incorporated at the Registrar of Companies,
it must register with the KIA and obtain an investment certificate. The IPA also requires
that enterprises in which there is foreign participation satisfy the minimum foreign capital
investment condition, and that the KIA undertake an assessment of the potential impact of
the investment to the Kenyan economy in terms of criteria such as, employment generation,
upgrade of skills, and transfer of technology. An environmental impact assessment, and
registration with other regulatory bodies may also be required, based on the activities of
the business. 226
In relation to the tax incentives that Kenya grants, although it has been suggested
that part of Kenya’s tax reforms are geared towards the introduction of new taxes and a
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reduction in the use of tax incentives, 227 the country still offers various kinds of tax
incentives in many sectors of the economy. The tax system is comprised of myriad pieces
of legislation, including the IPA; the ITA; the EPZA; and the SEZA that grant tax
concessions to investors.228 The major tax incentive schemes employed under these pieces
of legislation include tax holidays, ID allowances, customs duty exemptions, and
concessionary CIT rates for some sectors.
Most of the incentives are contained in the ITA and are of general application across
sectors, but others of specific application are contained in specific acts, such as, the IPA,
the EPZA, and the SEZA.229 The operation of the tax incentives is automatic, as provided
for under the Acts, except in a few specific cases where administrative intervention is
required. For example, although the current CIT rates applicable are 30 per cent for resident
corporations and 37.5 per cent for permanent establishments (PEs), reduced CIT rates
apply in specific sectors, including the capital markets and the local automobile industry.
Furthermore, to encourage investment in physical capital, including industrial buildings,
and machinery and equipment, IDs are allowed under the ITA in the tourism, hospitality,
and agricultural sectors; and accelerated deductions are allowed for plant, property and
equipment in EPZs, and mining.230
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B. HISTORY OF EFFORTS TO ATTRACT FDI IN KENYA, 1980-2017
As in most developing African countries, Kenya’s FDI flows have been subject to
high volatilities. After independence in 1963, because the country was less optimistic about
the benefits of free trade and investment, several policy strategies were adopted,
culminating in the alternation of the roles of the public and private sectors as drivers of the
economy. Eventually, there was a general shift from public to private investment-led
economy. 231
Beginning in the 1970s, due to various factors in favour of attracting FDI, the
country received relatively large capital inflows. Although the period suffered from
macroeconomic instability, investors considered the market-oriented FDI strategy, and a
large regional market, the EAC, as an advantage. This led to the positive net inflows. 232
However, by the close of the 1970s, because Kenya took a restrictive approach by imposing
trade controls as part of an industrialization process supported by import-substitution
strategies, FDI flows did not show a general positive trend. 233
The 1980s saw a rather sharp decline in FDI inflows, due to the implementation of
the SAPs, and a reduction in the market size after the collapse of the EAC. The policy
reversal and the shift away from import substitution to an export-oriented industrialization
strategy, coupled with significant changes in the political system and ineffective
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management of the economy, unsettled investor confidence, resulting in an abysmal FDI
performance.234
In addition, rising costs, ethnic infighting, persistent corruption, high political risks,
and souring relationship between the government and donors further weakened the
macroeconomic environment.235 The volatility in FDI flows continued, and by the close of
the decade, FDI was its lowest at 0.005 per cent of GDP. This prompted further policy
intervention.236
In the 1990s, comprehensive reform programmes aimed at macroeconomic stability
showed initial signs of positive response, with FDI increasing sharply in 1993. However,
by the close of the following year, FDI took a further dip. This was attributed to the fact
that government’s commitment to the reforms weakened along the way. With uncertainty
in return on investments, there were huge FDI outflows, and a downward economic
trend.237
The sharp but short-lived rise in 1993 was due to a policy intervention to make the
private sector a new engine of growth. Various initiatives were introduced by the GoK,
including the establishment of the EPZs in 1990, the introduction of low tariffs for plant
and machinery, and the liberalization of trade. These changes brought some positive
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response in terms of GDP growth, causing FDI to fluctuate between 1990 and 2010, with
unusual rises in 1993 (2.53 per cent of GDP) and 2007 (2.28 per cent of GDP).238
The period 2010-2016 witnessed another record rise and fall in FDI. FDI rose to its
peak at 3.457 per cent of GDP in 2011 (from 0.45 per cent in 2010), but took a nose dive
to 0.56 per cent of GDP in 2016.239 The sharp drop in FDI in 2016 may be due to escalated
security crisis in 2015. But for the crises, it would have been expected that the
establishment of the KIA in 2004, and the subsequent adoption of measures to streamline
investment and ensure investor assurance and guarantee against risk could have had a large
positive impact on FDI.240
Since 2016, FDI inflows have been rising steadily from USD 681.325 (in 2016) to
a high of USD 1.625 billion in 2018.241 The rise is at the back of policy reforms, including
the adoption of strategy on PPPs, initiated to restore investor confidence in the economy. 242
FDI inflows have mainly been in diverse industries including manufacturing, chemicals,
hospitality, and oil and gas. The positive trend is expected to continue in response to further
regulatory reforms such as ongoing integration within the EAC and the strategy to position
the country as a hub within the EAC. 243
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For the period 2018‑20, the growing trend is projected to further continue. Although
the Kenyan economy may remain susceptible to global economic uncertainties, sustained
economic growth and business-friendly reforms can keep investor confidence high, and
FDI on the increase. 244 Nonetheless, challenges, including insecurity, infrastructure
inadequacy, low skills, and corruption, may continue to threaten the growing trend in FDI,
and hamper Kenya’s efforts to increase foreign investment, and promote sustained growth
and development.245
Therefore, to keep the growing trend, Kenya will have to work to enhance the
investment climate through further reforms, good governance, and improved security,
infrastructure, and human skills. These measures will increase the country’s FDI
attractiveness, and ease the flow of resources from the global capital market into its
economy. 246

C. TAX INCENTIVE FRAMEWORK IN KENYA
As mentioned earlier, the statutory regimes that govern fiscal incentives in Kenya
include the ITA, the IPA, the EPZA, and the SPZA. Although these are the main pieces of
legislation regulating investment activities in the private sector, others, such as, the VATA,
2013; Finance Act, 2018; and the Nairobi International Financial Centre, 2017, provide for
specific tax incentives, and will be cited in the discussion under the appropriate incentive
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category. 247 The incentives are administered by the KRA, in collaboration with other
regulators, such as, the KCMA, and the EPZA.
Furthermore, the GoK provides a wide range of tax incentives to attract FDI,
including tax exemptions, reduction in CIT rates, investment allowances, accelerated
depreciation, special zones, and indirect tax incentives, capital deductions, industrial
deductions, and farm work deductions. 248 These deductions are mainly made at the point
of computation of the gains or profits of an entity, except in a few cases where
administrative intervention may be required. 249 In this section, I discuss five major tax
incentives, under five broad headings, in the order as follows: tax exemptions and tax
amnesty, general reduction in the CIT rates, targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate,
DTA, and import duty exemptions.

C.1. Tax Exemptions and Tax Amnesty
The GoK envisions transforming Kenya into an industrialized, middle-income
country by the year 2030, through a strategic, comprehensive and integrated programme.
The policy is to guide Kenya on its journey to industrialization by ensuring diversified and
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competitive manufacturing, tourism, agricultural, trade, financial, and BPO industries. 250
Tax incentive schemes have been adopted in order to foster an enabling environment to
accelerate industrial development through SMEs.251
In order to encourage the promotion and facilitation of export oriented investment,
the EPZA was enacted in 2015 to provide for the establishment of the KEPZA, and the
creation and management of EPZs.252 Under the EPZA, EPZEs are exempted from CIT for
ten years, starting from the first year of operation. After the initial ten years, EPZEs are
taxed at 25 per cent for the next ten years, and thereafter, 30 per cent for the remaining life
of the business. Also, EPZEs are entitled to 10 years WHT holiday on dividends and other
remittances to non-resident entities; VAT exemptions on local purchases of goods and
services; and customs duty exemptions on imported inputs, including raw materials,
machinery, and equipment. EPZEs are also granted perpetual exemption from payment of
stamp duty on legal instruments, and 100 per cent ID on investment in buildings and
machinery for a period of 20 years.
Approval must be granted by the KEPZA for a company to operate as an EPZE,
and at least 80 per cent of production must be for export. Domestic sales, within 20 per
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cent of output, must be approved and taxed at the standard CIT rate.253 The scheme is
administered by the KEPZA in collaboration with the KRA.
Secondly, for the purpose of promoting and facilitating the development, provision
and management of affordable and decent housing for all Kenyans; and in order to deepen
the use of efficient capital markets, and promote wider participation of the general public
in the securities and derivatives market in Kenya, concessionary tax schemes have been
designed for registered REITs, unit trusts, and collective investment ventures. Under the
Markets Act, 2000, registered unit trusts and collective investment schemes are income tax
exempt, provided they distribute 80 per cent of their net income. 254 Also, exemption from
stamp duty is granted on the initial transfer of property into a listed REIT scheme, and on
trading in a listed REIT security. However, dividends or distributions paid to investors are
charged 5 per cent withholding tax, and the administering body is the KRA. 255
Furthermore, as part of efforts by the Kenyan government to promote investment,
and increase the revenue base by encouraging the repatriation of financial assets taken out
of the country, a tax amnesty on foreign income has been instituted. The amnesty
programme is to provide an avenue for taxpayers who have not been declaring taxable
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foreign income to do so, and bring back assets held, and incomes earned or derived outside
of Kenya. 256
In addition, even though the overall objective, as mentioned earlier, is to encourage
voluntary repatriation of foreign held assets to Kenya and invest in the development of the
Nation, the tax amnesty programme is part of the preparatory works to join the CRS regime,
for the purpose of automatic sharing of annual financial account information.
Under the Finance Act, 2018, taxpayers who received untaxed Kenya-sourced
income or assets, earned in Kenya, which are now located outside Kenya, can have amnesty
covering taxes, penalties, and interest, and declared funds may be exempted from criminal,
and or related investigations.257 The amnesty covers the period up to 31st December 2017,
and is available to all resident entities, including individuals, corporations, trusts, and
international organisations. Entities wishing to take advantage of the programme would
have to disclose the foreign income earned up to and including the year ended 31st
December 2017, on or before 30th June 2019.258
Additionally, funds voluntarily declared under the programme shall be repatriated
not later than 30th June 2019. However, provision is made for late transfers up to 30th June
2024. Where the Funds have not been transferred to Kenya by this date, a 5-year extension
period may be granted, with a penalty of 10 per cent levied on the transfer. However, the
amnesty will cease to apply where such voluntarily declared funds are not repatriated
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within the 5 years period, and repatriations can be made in instalments, on or before the
filing of the return.259
Foreign assets, such as bank deposits, investment portfolios, insurance policies,
shares and other properties, situated outside Kenya, and funded by income derived from or
accruing from sources within Kenya, including those held under trust, or foreign income
earned outside Kenya which would have been taxable under Kenyan laws, may be
repatriated.260 In situations where the funds cannot be repatriated for reasons beyond the
taxpayer’s control, the discretion of the Commissioner of the KRA is required. 261 The
programme is administered by the KRA, and taxpayers who wish to be considered for the
amnesty would have to apply on the KRA’s online platform. 262

C.2. General CIT rates reduced
As indicated earlier, the CIT rates applicable in Kenya is 30 per cent for resident
corporations, and 37.5 per cent for PEs. That notwithstanding, in order to promote and
facilitate domestic and foreign investment in key strategic sectors of the economy, GoK
provides reduced CIT rates for enterprises in certain sectors of the economy, including the
financial sector, the housing industry, and the manufacturing sector.
Firstly, for the purpose of stimulating long-term investments to deepen the
operation of efficient capital markets, by enabling the establishment of a nationwide
system of commodity and derivatives markets, and in order to encourage the development
259
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of new financial products and institutions, an incentive programme has been developed
for operators in the capital market. Under the ITA and the Capital Markets Act, 2013,
newly listed companies on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) are entitled to reduced CIT
rates.263
The reduced rates vary between 20 per cent and 27 per cent, and apply for a period
of 3 to 5 years, depending on the percentage of capital listed. 264 Where 20 per cent of
shares are listed, a reduced CIT rate of 27 per cent is applicable for the first three years
after listing; where 30 per cent of shares are listed, a 25 per cent CIT rate is applicable for
the first five years after listing; and where 40 per cent of shares are listed, a CIT rate of 20
per cent is applicable for the first five years after listing. Also, gains realised from securities
listed on the NSE are exempt from tax. The incentive scheme is administered by the KRA.
Secondly, in order to promote and facilitate investment in integrated infrastructural
facilities, and other economic and business activities in designated areas, a special scheme
broader in concept than that under the EPZA, has been instituted under the SEZA in
2015.265 The Act also established the KSEZA to regulate activities within the designated
areas, and to design, approve, establish, develop, and promote SEZEs. The KSEZA is also
in charge of determining the investment criteria and investment thresholds for the
businesses in the zone, and ensuring that investors have access to quality infrastructure,
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and are well incentivized to enhance productivity. 266

It is also to make policy

recommendations to the government in relation to the ease of investing, investor protection,
simplified tax regimes, and labour regulations. 267
Under the Act, SEZEs, developers, and operators are entitled to a reduced CIT rate
of 10 per cent for the first ten years of operation, and a CIT rate of 15 per cent for the next
ten years. SEZEs are also granted exemption from withholding taxes and VAT on goods
and services supplied to them, and 100 to 150 per cent ID for buildings and other capital
expenditures. In addition, instruments relating to the business activities of licensed SEZEs
are exempt from stamp duty, and SEZEs can repatriate their profits.
The Secretary in charge of Industrialization may declare any area as special
economic zone, and businesses may apply to be granted SEZEs status, or set up operations
within existing zones. 268 SEZEs may also include free trade zones, industrial parks, free
ports, ICT parks, science and technology parks, recreational zones, business service parks,
and livestock zones. Licensing of SEZs is done by KSEZA, and the tax incentive is
administered by the KRA. 269
Thirdly, GoK wants to ensure the provision and management of affordable and
decent housing for all Kenyans through the facilitation of financial resource mobilization
and management in the housing industry. In order to achieve this objective, an incentive
scheme has been designed for the housing industry. Under the Finance Act, 2018, real
estate developers who will construct at least 100 housing units per year are entitled to a
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reduced CIT rate of 15 per cent, and the sale of land and residential premises are VAT
exempt.270 In addition, the GoK is to establish a NSHDF, and strengthen the NHC to fast
track the achievement of this vision. 271
Fourthly, in order to facilitate, promote and boost the local auto industry, and
enhance the capacity of SMEs in the local assembling of motor vehicles and manufacturing
of parts, an incentive scheme has been designed for the sector. Under the National
Automotive Policy, 2019, local motor vehicle assembly companies have been granted a
concessionary CIT rate of 15 per cent for the first five years of operation. This may be
extended for a further period of five years for companies whose local content will be
equivalent to 50 per cent of the value chain. 272 The programme is under the SEZs scheme,
and qualifying firms are entitled to 10 per cent import duty, or 10 per cent excise duty for
3 years, for 1000 units of production, if all consumable parts are procured or manufactured
locally. 273
Furthermore, local content developers are exempted from import and excise duties,
and entitled to 50 per cent discount on corporate tax for 10 years. Additionally, the local
forging and casting industry under the scheme will be granted 100 per cent discount on
income tax for 10 years, and excise and import duty exemptions on materials for 3 to 10
years, depending on the percentage of value addition.274 However, a higher tariff rate of
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25 per cent will be applicable where parts are imported. The programme is run by the
Department for Industrialization, and the incentive scheme by the KRA. 275
Fifthly, in order to position Kenya as an international commercial and financial
hub, and become a premier aviation hub in the East African region, the aviation industry
has been given concessionary tax rates to enhance its competitiveness. Under the ITA and
the Finance Act 2018, the ownership and operation of ships and aircraft is charged a
reduced CIT rate of 2.5 percent.276 Also, in order to transform Kenya into an ICT hub in
East Africa, and leverage on ICT to support the growth of the economy through innovation
and job creation, the transmission of messages is offered a concessionary CIT rate of 5 per
cent. This scheme is also under the ITA, and is administered by the KRA. 277
Finally, under a special operating framework to attract investment into key priority
areas, and create job opportunities to enhance prosperity, the KoG has identified four key
sectors that will provide the necessary spillover effects for economic growth and
development, including affordable housing, manufacturing, infrastructure, and food
production. Under the Finance Act, 2018, strategic entities operating under the special
operating framework arrangement can negotiate for special CIT rates, and other incentive
packages. 278 However, although the ITA gives the Minister the right to demand by notice
the filing of returns by any person for tax assessment purposes, the Finance Act 2018 does
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not make any provision for reporting, monitoring or assessment of tax incentives granted
to firms under the special operating framework scheme. No regulation that makes provision
to that effect has also been sighted.279

C.3. Targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate
In this section, we consider incentive schemes aimed at reducing the effective CIT
rate, including accelerated depreciation, investment deduction, and capital deduction,
granted to strategic major investment projects. As discussed in the previous chapter,
incentives schemes targeted at reducing the effective CIT rate differ in operation from
general CIT-reducing incentives considered above. While the latter involve a direct
reduction in the CIT rate, the former operate by reducing the cost of production, and
thereby lessening the tax burden.
Generally, the GoK recognises the existence of huge infrastructure gaps in key
sectors, including roads, rail and the ports, as constraints to economic growth. In order to
lower the cost of closing the gap, and enhance access to manufacturing zones, tax incentive
schemes have been designed to induce private investment into the development and
efficient management of modern infrastructure in ports, railways, and other key sectors.280
First of all, to encourage investment in physical capital such as industrial buildings,
machinery and equipment, IDs are allowed.281 Under the ITA, 100 per cent deductions are
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claimable on building and machinery, civil works and structures forming part of an
industrial building, and filming equipment of a local film producer. 282
Secondly, the GoK under the National Tourism Strategy, aims to reinforce the
Kenyan tourism industry as a high quality service sector, and position the country as the
number one tourism destination in East Africa. 283 Tourism in Kenya is the second-largest
foreign exchange earner, following agriculture. 284 However, inadequate financing and
investment in the sector are reported to be hampering its growth and contribution to
national development. The GoK therefore, is promoting investment in tourism
infrastructure, and adopting policy measures to ensure the efficient management,
marketing, and regulation of the sector.285
Therefore, under the ITA and the Tourism Act, the tourism industry is granted a
concessionary tax treatment.286 Firstly, under the ITA, 100 per cent ID is allowed for hotel
buildings, and customs duty exemptions are granted on a number of items purchased by
hotels, such as, equipment, furniture and fixtures. 287 Also, all locally financed materials
and equipment used in the construction of tourist hotels, tourism facilities, recreational
parks, and convention and conference facilities are excluded from tax, and local services
supplied to a hotel or restaurant is VAT exempt. 288
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Furthermore, to encourage the dispersion of investment outside the central business
districts of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, construction of a building or purchase and
installation of machinery for manufacturing purposes exceeding KES 200 million (about
USD 1.95 million) incurred outside the municipalities of Nairobi, Mombasa or Kisumu are
allowed an ID of 150 per cent.
Additionally, shipping enterprises can are entitled to 100 per cent IDs for the
purchase of a new power driven ship of more than 125 tons. However, the deduction is
disallowed where a ship is sold within a period of five years after the deduction has been
granted.
Moreover, industrial or capital deductions are allowed for the construction of an
industrial building to be used in a business. For an industrial building, 2.5 per cent capital
deduction is applicable within the first 40 years of operation; for hotels, 10 per cent capital
deduction is allowed within the first 10 years of operation; for hostels and educational
buildings, 50 per cent capital deduction is granted for the first 2 years of operation for
buildings used in training film producers, actors or crew, 100 per cent capital deduction;
and for approved rental residential and commercial buildings, 25 per cent capital
deduction. 289 Also, production of export goods under bonded warehouses is entitled to 100
per cent investment deduction. The administering authority is the KRA.
Furthermore, although Kenya does not allow deduction for accounting depreciation
or impairment, in order to encourage investment in capital-intensive key sectors, such as
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manufacturing, telecommunication, petroleum, and agriculture, accelerated depreciation
and depletion of assets is permitted at varying rates.
Class one assets, including heavy earth moving equipment, such as, caterpillars,
tippers, tractors, loaders, rollers and graders, combine harvesters, mobile cranes and
forklifts, are allowed to be depreciated at 37.5 per cent. Class two assets, including office
machinery and equipment, such as, computers printers, scanners and processors,
photocopiers, stamping and fax machines, and cash registers, are also allowed to be
depreciated at 30 per cent. Class three assets, including other self-propelling machines,
such as, motor bikes, saloon cars and hatchbacks, pick-ups and delivery vans, aircrafts, and
minibuses, can be depreciated at 25 per cent.
Class four assets, including other non-self-propelling machines, such as, ships,
bicycles, wheelbarrows, lifts and conveyor belts, furniture and fittings, tractor trailer, train
coaches, milking machinery, ploughs and lawn mowers, and petroleum pipelines, can be
depreciated at 12.5 per cent. Class five assets, including computer software and
telecommunication equipment, can be depreciated at 20 per cent for five years; and
irrevocable right to use fibre optic cable, at 5 per cent.290
Moreover, in order to encourage investment in the mining industry, and to
compensate for the high risk associated with the industry, accelerated deductions are
allowed for all mining and specified minerals equipment, at 40 per cent in the first year,
and 10 per cent for the remaining 6 years.
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accumulation, and encourage modernization in the agricultural sector, farm works
deductions are allowed on construction of farm works at the rate of 20 per cent for 5 years;
and one-third of the expenditure on farm houses are deductible, and expenditure on
immovable property for the operation of a farm can be deducted at 100 per cent.291

C.4. DTAs
As has been seen in the previous chapter, DTAs are international tax treaties to
ensure relief from the multiple taxation of incomes of entities in any of the jurisdictions
under the treaty. DTAs can be useful to ensure that income earned by TNCs is not subjected
to taxation by both the source state and resident state. DTAs also enhance cooperation
among tax administrations, especially in fighting international tax evasion.
The GoK uses DTAs as tax incentives to effectively reduce the tax burden of
international investors and permanent establishment, and thereby encourage international
investments.292 By using DTAs, Kenya’s ensures that the incidence of double taxation on
incomes earned in Kenya by residents of other countries with which Kenya has such
agreements is minimized or eliminated. The power to enter into DTAs is provided for under
the ITA.293
As of March 2018, Kenya has signed and ratified 14 DTAs with other countries
including, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom,
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Taxkenya.com

Zambia, South Africa, Qatar, UAE, South Korea and the Netherlands. 294 DTA rates are
applicable on dividends, interest, royalties, and management and professional fees.
Furthermore, where there is a DTA in force, lower rates may apply to non-residents. Table
3 shows the rates applicable under the various agreements in force. Kenya provides no tax
credit for foreign tax paid on business income except as provided for under a DTA. Under
such an agreement, some investments may be allowed to make deductions against their tax
liabilities, or foreign tax expense.
Furthermore, under the ITA, Kenya imposes no WHT if the beneficiary is a resident
company controlling at least 12.5 per cent of the capital in the paying company. However,
WHT is levied at rates 3 per cent and 30 per cent on a range of payments to both resident
and non-resident entities, and non-resident WHT is a final tax.295 Loan interest paid to
residents and non-residents is subject to a 15 per cent WHT, and royalties paid by a resident
person to a non-resident person are subject to a 20 per cent WHT. Payments of management
and professional fees paid to a non-resident person are subject to 20 per cent WHT.296 As
indicated earlier, the rate of WHT may be reduced where a double tax treaty with Kenya
applies.297 WHT rates applicable on payments to non-residents in the oil and gas sector are
as follows: dividends 10 per cent, interest 15 per cent, natural resource income 20 per cent,

294

See Oxfam, supra note 7 at 33. See also Deloitte, “Kenya Tax Treaty Workshop” (29 March 2018), online:
Deloitte <www2.deloitte.com> [perma.cc/ke/en/pages/tax/articles/kenya-tax-treaty.html].
295
The non-resident WHT is considered the ultimate tax obligation to Ghana on that income – the recipient
of the payment is not obliged to report this income on his tax return. See Canada Revenue Agency, “NonResidents and Income Tax – 2018” (8 July 2019), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca>
[perma.cc/en/revenue-agency/services/forms-publications/publications/t4058/non-residents-income-tax2016.html].
296
ITA Kenya, supra note 20, ss. 3, 7.34, 39.
297
For example, the WHT rate for management and professional fees under the Kenya-United Kingdom
double tax treaty is 12.5 percent. See ALN, “Investment Guide – Kenya” (31 December 2015), online (pdf):
ALN <www.africalegalnetwork.com> [perma.cc/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Kenya-Investment-Guide2015.pdf] at 11.

96

and management or professional fees 12.5 per cent. Table 4 provides the general WHT
rates applicable to various incomes.
Capital gains (and losses) on gains arising from transfer of property situated in
Kenya are charged at the rate of 5 per cent. Property includes shares of companies, land
and buildings and other assets. Various exemptions are provided on capital gains, including
where certain thresholds have been met. For example, gains on the transfer of agricultural
property of less than 100 acres are tax exempt.298
However, like Ghana, Kenya treats dividends and interest slightly different from
the rule prescribed under the OECDMTC. As seen in the previous chapter, the OECDMTC
does not allow the extra-territorial taxation of dividends and interest realised through
permanent establishments (PEs). This is in order to avoid double taxation. Under the
OECDMTC, the taxing rights of resident states of PEs is restricted under Articles 10 and
11, in addition to Article 7. These provide that the rate at which dividends may be taxed by
a resident contracting state shall not exceed 15 per cent, and that for interest should not be
greater than 10 per cent.
However, under the ITA, Kenya regards interest and dividends of paid by PEs to
non-residents as income accrued in or derived from Kenya, and are, therefore, subject to
tax.299 Also, as in Ghana, where the debt obligation giving rise to the interest is secured by
real property situated in Kenya, the interest is deemed as sourced from Kenya, and is
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taxable in Kenya. But the rate at which dividends are taxed in Kenya is consistent with the
OCDMTC provisions.300
Moreover, with regard to interest, the minimum rate at which interest is charged in
Kenya is the upper limit provided for under the OECDMT. The OECDMT requires that
charges on interest should not exceed 10 per cent, but Kenya taxes interest paid to nonresident persons between 10 and 20 per cent. Thus, the OECDMT’s ceiling is Kenya’s
floor, and Kenya’s upper limit of 20 per cent exceeds the OECD Model’s ceiling of 10 per
cent, by 10 percentage points.
Therefore, unlike as provided for under the OECDMT, dividends and interest of
PEs are treated as income of a resident entity, and subject to tax in Kenya. Furthermore,
the income and liability of a PE are treated as if the PE is a different entity from its owner,
but business arrangements between the two entities are duly regarded.

C.5. Import duty exemptions / reduced excise duty
The GoK, under Vision 2030, desires to revive the industrial sector in order to
support value addition, and increase the sector’s contribution to 15 per cent of GDP over
the medium term (by 2022). In line with this, interventions to increase the production of
domestically manufactured goods have been adopted to steer the needed industrial growth,
and make the country globally competitive. Special programmes have been designed
targeting critical sectors including, iron and steel production, manufacture of fertilizers,
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agro-processing, machine tools and machinery, motor vehicle assembly, and manufacture
of spare parts, for investment under a PPP framework.301
In this light, although import duties in Kenya are administered under the EACCMA,
2004 based on the nature and description of the goods in the Custom External Tariff Code,
concessionary duty rates have been granted to iron and steel, textile and footwear, paper,
timber, and vegetable oil production entities.302 Three input categories have been identified
under the scheme for tax concessions. First, raw materials, capital goods, agricultural
inputs, certain medicines, and medical equipment are import duty exempt; second, semifinished goods, to be used as input in production, are charged 10 per cent import duty; and
third, finished products are charged import duty at the rate of 25 per cent.303
Further, in order to promote the penetration of ICT, and support the assembly of
computer and computer accessories locally, imported computer parts or parts purchased
locally for the assembly of computers are exempted from import duty and VAT. 304 In
addition, under the VATA most machinery for manufacturing, and services relating to
goods in transit, are fully exempt from VAT. 305 However, all other imported finished goods
attract VAT at the rate of 16 per cent. The VATA also provides for tax exemptions for
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goods and services exported from Kenya, goods and services supplied to EPZEs, export of
coffee and tea, and the supply or importation of goods used in agriculture, health and
education. 306 Furthermore, under the VATA, the Minister of Finance and Economic
Planning may remit taxes payable on any goods or services if he is satisfied that it is in the
public interest to do so.307 The administrative body in charge of the scheme is the KRA.

D. EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES IN KENYA
Although it has been suggested that tax incentives have a significant positive impact
on the attraction and retention of FDI, and, therefore, investment levels and the GDP
growth rate in Kenya308, there are concerns, as in many other developing African countries,
about the detrimental effect of tax incentives on tax revenue.
Tax incentives have been found to deprive Kenya of revenue needed to reduce
poverty, and improve the general welfare of the population. The government has not been
able to strike the appropriate balance between increasing tax revenue collection and
encouraging investment through the use of tax incentives. Moreover, by resorting to the
use of a wide range of tax incentives, other desirable goals associated with taxation, such
as simplifying the tax system, strengthening tax administration, and achieving equity in the
tax burden, have also been overlooked.309
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Empirical evidence shows that FDI has not played an important role in the Kenyan
economy despite several reforms that have been undertaken, and the many incentives
provided to foreign investors under such reforms. It has also been suggested that tax
incentives in Kenya are introduced through lobbying, and in an ad hoc manner, without
proper medium to long-term impact assessment.310 The assertion, therefore, is that the
disadvantages of tax incentives in Kenya far outnumber the advantages, and that countries
that have been most successful in attracting FDI have not offered as generous tax
concessions as Kenya may seek to do.311 Moreover, it has been observed that no costbenefit analysis has ever been conducted to ascertain the net benefit of tax incentive
programmes in Kenya. 312
It has been estimated that Kenya is losing over USD 1.1 billion a year through the
use of tax incentives. In the fiscal year 2009-10, an estimated amount of USD 3.05 billion,
about 3.1 per cent of Kenya’s GDP, projected to be the difference between actual and
potential revenue collection, was mostly attributed to tax incentives, including CIT, VAT
and import duty exemptions. In addition, revenue loss as a result of trade-related tax
incentives in 2007-8 fiscal year was USD 133 million, and import duty exemptions for the
same period was USD 566.9 million. Overall, investment related incentives accounted for
72.4 per cent of total revenue loss for the period, and export related incentives accounted
for 27.6 per cent of total revenue loss for the same period. The loss averagely translates
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into USD 423.5 million, or about 1.7 per cent of total GDP for the period (the figure could
be higher if all tax incentives were captured).313
Additionally, the government has consistently missed its revenue targets. Over the
last decades revenues collected have not been sufficient to fund the budget, resulting in
budget deficits.314 Also, for the six years period, 2003-04 to 2008-09, the total amount of
revenue lost in Kenya was estimated at USD 2.56 billion. This translates to an average of
USD 427 million in a year.315 Moreover, a study on the tax incentive trend for the period
2003-2012 shows that revenue losses due to IDs were about USD 143.06 million. 316
Furthermore, it has also been found that that although tax incentives may be
valuable in attracting EPZ firms, the survival of these firms depends on factors other than
tax incentives, and that EPZ firms leave when their tax holiday period is expired, to avoid
paying taxes.317 Also, the lack of transparency has long prevented the public from
adequately scrutinising tax incentives. 318
In summary, since it has been established that not only are tax incentives not needed
to attract FDI, but also that tax incentives have resulted in large revenue losses to the
Kenyan government, and that the use of tax incentives has in recent years attracted very
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low levels of FDI. It is important, therefore, that the government focus on improving the
investment fundamentals. It is suggested that factors, including security, good governance,
infrastructure, respect for the rule of law, and openness to trade 319, must be given critical
attention, as opposed to the use of tax incentives which is likely to result in further
distortions in the tax system, large administrative costs, and rent-seeking, compounded
inefficiencies, and corruption.320 An alternative approach may be for the Kenyan
government to maximize efficient tax collection, and use part of the revenue to offer
financial incentives through direct expenditure. 321
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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF TAX INCENTIVES IN GHANA AND KENYA

This chapter analyzes the tax incentive regimes for promoting and attracting FDI
in Ghana and Kenya. It has two main parts. Part A analyses the two tax incentive regimes
under five categories (the tax incentives in the two regimes were each discussed under
these five categories in chapters 3 and 4, respectively) – namely: tax exemption and tax
amnesty schemes, general reduced CIT rates, targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate,
DTAs, and import duty exemption and reduced excise duty schemes. The analyses reveal
that there is a considerable degree of similarity in tax incentive provisions, investment laws,
and general tax administration structures in both countries, save slight variations in the
codification, classification and duration of incentive provisions. This observation is
generally true of most the sub-Saharan African countries.
Part B makes ten recommendations to enable effective and efficient use of tax
incentives in sub-Saharan African countries in general: only the MoFEP should be
responsible for administering tax incentives; each tax incentive programme should have a
specific sunset provision as part of the original legislation; profit-based tax incentive
schemes should be avoided – instead, cost-based tax incentives should be used; tax
incentives must be restricted and targeted; tax incentive policies should benefit both
domestic and foreign investors; frequent amnesty schemes should be stopped – instead,
monitoring and enforcement must be improved; DTAs must be

reviewed, and

circumspection is required in signing new DTAs; tax incentives must be based on clear,
objective eligibility criteria, with as little discretion as possible; all tax incentives should
be consolidated in one legislation; and tax incentives must be disclosed to Parliament.
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A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A.1. Tax Exemption and Tax Amnesty schemes
By means of comparison, both Ghana and Kenya offer tax exemptions and tax
amnesty schemes. In both countries, tax exemptions are granted on a long-term basis with
the objective of promoting industrialization and facilitating exports within their respective
sub-regions – West Africa, in Ghana’s case; and East Africa, in Kenya’s case. Also, each
country has legislation providing for its tax exemption scheme and institutions established
under the legislation to administer the scheme. Similarly, in both countries, the tax
exemption scheme is administered by the tax authorities – GRA and KRA. However, the
licensing of enterprises to entitle them to the benefits under the tax incentive schemes is
undertaken by the regulatory bodies established under the respective Acts – that is, GFZB,
and KEPA. 322
A common characteristic of the two exemption schemes is that they each provide
additional tax concessions on inputs. For instance, in Ghana, FZEs are exempt from
payment of duties on imported raw materials and inputs, and their shareholders are
exempted from the payment of withholding taxes on dividends arising out of FZ
investments. Similarly, in Kenya, shareholders of enterprises under EPZs are entitled to 10
years WHT holiday on dividends and other remittances, and raw materials and other inputs
are exempted from local taxes. However, Kenya’s exemption scheme also provides for 100
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per cent ID on buildings and machinery – a feature that is not available under Ghana’s
exemption scheme.
Nonetheless, there is a major distinction between the schemes in the two countries.
Although the qualifying entities are more or less the same, whereas the incentive scheme
in Ghana ends after 20 years, the incentive scheme in Kenya is indefinite. Ghana’s scheme
is in two distinct stages – qualifying entities are entitled to tax exemption for the first ten
years of operation, and thereafter, an additional ten years of reduced CIT rates (15 per cent
on exports, and 25 per cent on domestic sales); Kenya’s scheme is in three stages – EPZEs
are exempted from CIT for the first ten years of operation, taxed at 25 per cent for the next
ten years, and at 30 per cent for the remaining life of the business (domestic sales are taxed
at the standard rate of 30 per cent).
The observation is that, under the tax exemption scheme, Kenya grants bigger tax
concessions than Ghana. It implies that if investors were motivated only by profit, they
may prefer Kenya to Ghana, and Kenya may attract more FDI because it grants more
concessions. However, Kenya’s relatively generous incentive scheme may just constitute
more of a give-away, and higher revenue loss. This is because, generally, investors are not
attracted by considerations only of tax incentives, but also by the existence of other
fundamental factors making up the investment climate, such as, good infrastructure, sound
macroeconomic policies, security of investment, and the rule of law. Also, a bigger ripple
effect in terms of revenue loss through exemption schemes is expected in Kenya than in
Ghana. A bigger impact is expected in Kenya because, as noted in Chapters Three and
Four, in the case of both Ghana and Kenya, incentive schemes have been subjected to
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abuse. And, because Kenya offers more tax concessions relative to Ghana, the opportunity
for abuse in Kenya is expected to be higher than in Ghana.
Moreover, as noted earlier, both Ghana and Kenya have granted tax amnesty
schemes with the objective of enhancing revenue mobilization and expanding the tax base.
In both cases, the amnesty schemes are on a short-term basis. Although it not clear how
frequently tax amnesty schemes are offered in Kenya, the recent amnesty scheme in Ghana
is the first to be offered in the last seven years. 323 However, the main difference between
the two schemes is that, while the scheme in Ghana is aimed at encouraging a voluntary
compliance culture, the scheme in Kenya is aimed at encouraging the repatriation of assets
held or derived outside of Kenya, and preparing the country to join the CRS regime.324
Additionally, it can be observed that although the schemes in both countries are
designed to foster tax compliance, in principle, Kenya’s amnesty scheme appears novel
and more ambitious – it may likely have more positive impact on FDI attraction than
Ghana’s. This is because, as mentioned earlier, Kenya aims its scheme at encouraging the
repatriation of foreign assets held abroad or incomes abroad derived in Kenya. However,
it is not estimated how much of income or assets are held abroad by residents in Kenya.
Furthermore, the scheme in Kenya offers too long a period of time for the amnesty – it
makes provision for a 5-year extension period, although with a penalty of 10 per cent to be
levied on the transfer. This can further weaken the effectiveness of the whole scheme.
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Further, another major concern in both Ghana and Kenya is that amnesty
programmes may have a dire impact on revenue mobilization by weakening taxpayer
attitudes and moral, and thereby engendering corruption and non-compliance. This is
because, if amnesty schemes are resorted to too frequently as an alternative to enforcing
the tax laws by prosecuting offenders, taxpayers may become accustomed to them and take
them as routine. This will heighten the risk of taxpayers becoming lukewarm (by adopting
a wait-and-see attitude) in fulfilling their tax obligations. Moreover, defaulters may even
resort to bribing tax officials, or governments to declare amnesty programmes. 325

A.2. General reduced CIT rates
In addition, the analysis indicates that, under reduced CIT rates in both Ghana and
Kenya, there are tax incentive programmes that provide reduced CIT rates in key priority
sectors. While the general CIT rate in Ghana is 25 per cent; the general CIT rate in Kenya
is 30 per cent for resident corporations, and 37.5 per cent for permanent establishments
(PEs). In both cases, concessionary CIT rates are provided in the manufacturing, financial,
and the housing sectors. However, in addition to the three common sectors each country
provides reduced CIT rates in other sectors. For example, Ghana provides reduced CIT
rates in five additional sectors, including non-traditional exports, agriculture, tourism and
creative arts, and mining. On the other hand, Kenya provides reduced CIT rates in four
additional sectors, including transport, ICT, SEZs, and the local automobile industry. 326
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Moreover, it is worth noting that Ghana’s tax incentive programme is more
elaborately designed in favour of rural development, particularly in the manufacturing
sector (with various categorizations for industrial cities, regional capitals, and the less
developed areas of the country). On the other hand, Kenya’s incentive programme does not
have general locational incentives. The only location-based tax incentive Kenya offers is
ID of 150 per cent for investments outside Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, as against a
deduction of 100 per cent for investments located in any of the three major cities. It may
be concluded that the GoK does not have a policy to steer investment to specific geographic
locations. 327 Comparatively, even though it can be argued that Ghana’s design may allow
for an even spread of investment opportunities across all sectors and all geographical
regions, Kenya’s simple and uniform design may be more advantageous in allowing for
effective monitoring and supervision.
Furthermore, in terms of tax incentives for the capital markets, although the risk of
revenue loss in both Ghana and Kenya is high – because tax incentive schemes permit
entities to negotiate tax concessions – Kenya’s design may allow for less revenue to be
ceded. This is because, compared to Ghana, Kenya does not provide a blanket reduced CIT
rates in the financial. Rather, Kenya’s incentive programme in this category is structured
according to percentage listing on the markets.328
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A.3. Targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate
Further, the analysis shows that under targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate,
if tax concessions were the only determinant of FDI attraction, Kenya would be expected
to attract more FDI than Ghana. This is because, in spite of the fact that both Ghana and
Kenya offer various schemes, including accelerated depreciation, interest expense, capital
gains and losses, loss carry forward, and special initiatives, aimed at reducing the effective
CIT rate in sectors such as, manufacturing, agriculture, and mining, the deductions are not
based on geographical locations; arguably, Kenya makes bigger tax incentives than Ghana.
For instance, in terms of accelerated depreciation, although both countries disallow
enterprise-specific depreciation deductions, accelerated deductions are granted at
prescribed statutory rates in key sectors such as manufacturing, telecommunication,
petroleum, and agriculture. However, in both countries, the assets are grouped together,
and classified in the same pool. For example, assets including computers and accessories,
are classified in Ghana as class one assets, and allowed a deduction rated of 40 per cent.
On the other hand, similar assets are classified in Kenya as class two assets, and allowed a
deduction rate of 30 per cent. Similarly, while assets including plant and machinery and
automobiles, are classified in Ghana as class two asset and allowed a deduction of 30 per
cent; similar assets in Kenya are classified as class one assets and are allowed to be
depreciated at 37.5 per cent.
In additionally, in both Ghana and Kenya interest expense is deductible in priority
sectors, including farming, petroleum, mining, and agro-processing, ICT, manufacturing,
and tourism. However, Kenya, additionally, allows 100 per cent deductions on building
and machinery, including civil works and structures – which is not available in Ghana.
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Also, unlike Ghana, Kenya provides custom duty exemptions on inputs for building and
running of hotels, including equipment, and furniture and fixtures. Such concessions are
not available in Ghana.
Moreover, Kenya offers more concessions in IDs and capital allowances. For
instance, 150 per cent IDs are allowed for investments of about KES 200 million (about
USD 1.95 million) made in the manufacturing sector outside the municipalities of Nairobi,
Mombasa or Kisumu; and 100 per cent deduction is allowed in shipping and production of
export goods under bonded warehouses. In addition, the mining industry in Kenya is
allowed accelerated deductions at 40 per cent in the first year, and 10 per cent for the
remaining 6 years; and the agricultural sector is allowed 100 per cent deductions on all
immovable farm property. On the other hand, Ghana’s does not have ID schemes.
Furthermore its deduction allowance scheme is not geographically based.

A.4. DTAs / TSAs
The analysis reveals that both Ghana and Kenya have signed DTAs to provide
reduced tax rates for non-resident individuals as an incentive to ensure relief from multiple
taxation of incomes. In Ghana, DTAs are provided for under the GIPC Act; in Kenya,
DTAs are provided for under the ITA.329 Ghana has signed DTAs with 12 other countries;
Kenya, on the other hand, has signed DTAs with 14 other countries. 330 However, each of
the two countries has DTAs with 6 countries in common: France, Germany, United
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Kingdom, South Africa, Netherlands, and Denmark. In addition, while Ghana has DTAs
with Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Singapore, Mauritius, Kenya does not
have DTAs with these countries. Likewise, while Kenya has DTAs with Canada, India,
Norway, Sweden, Zambia, Qatar, UAE and South Korea, Ghana does not have DTAs with
these countries.
Each country has given tax concessions as part of its DTA negotiations. DTAs
provisions are applicable on dividends, interest, royalties, and management and
professional fees, at reduced withholding rates (discussed further below). However, while
Ghana generally provides tax credit for foreign tax paid Kenya does not – except as
provided for under a DTA. Each country has also used its DTAs to secure tax sparing
provisions. As of 2016, Ghana and Kenya have each signed a TSA with at least two OECD
countries – Ghana has signed 2, and Kenya has signed 6. 331
Comparing the two countries to the OECDMTC, both Ghana and Kenya treat
dividends and interest slightly differently from the rule prescribed under the OECD Model.
As noted in the previous chapter, the OECD Model rules out the extra-territorial taxation
of dividends and interest of permanent establishments (PEs). The taxing rights of source
States is restricted under Articles 10 and 11, in combination with Article 7, in order to
avoid double taxation of interest and dividends – interest and dividends are taxable under
Article 7, as part of the profits attributable to the PE.332 The Model provides that WHT on
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dividends should not exceed 15 per cent, and that on interest should not be greater than 10
per cent.
However, both Ghana and Kenya treat interest and dividends of PEs as income
accrued in or derived from their respective countries, and are, therefore, subject to tax.333
Also, in both Ghana and Kenya, where the debt obligation giving rise to the interest is
secured by real property situated within the jurisdiction, it is deemed as sourced from the
jurisdiction, and, therefore, taxable.
Also, in both Ghana and Kenya, the rate at which dividends are taxed is consistent
with the OECD Model provisions – the Model provides for dividends to be taxed between
5 and 15 per cent.334 However, each country varies in treatment of interest, compared to
the OECD Model. The Model requires that charges on interest should not exceed 10 per
cent. But Ghana taxes interest paid to non-resident persons between 7 and 12.5 per cent,335
and Kenya charges interest at between 10 and 20 per cent. Thus, Ghana’s upper limit of
12.5 per cent exceeds the OECD Model’s provision of 10 per cent, by 2.5 percentage
points,336 and Kenya’s upper limit of 20 per cent exceeds the OECD Model’s ceiling of 10
per cent, by 10 percentage points (i.e., the OECD Model’s ceiling is Kenya’s floor).
Therefore, in both Ghana and Kenya, unlike as provided for under the OECD
Model, dividends and interest of PEs are treated as income of a resident entity, and are
subject to tax. Furthermore, in both countries, the income and liability of a PE are
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differentiated from those its owner, but business arrangements between the two entities are
recognised. Moreover, the net profit of a branch is deemed as repatriated profits, and
subject to a final WHT as provided in Tables 2 and 4, for Ghana and Kenya, respectively. 337
However, although DTAs and TSAs can be useful in attracting investment, and
enhancing cooperation among tax administrations, especially in fighting international tax
evasion,338 caution must be exercised by both countries in signing such agreements. This
is because the effectiveness of DTAs and TSAs may be skewed against both Ghana and
Kenya, as developing or capital importing countries. DTAs and TSAs have been proved to
be useful in some cases, and at the same time, detrimental in many cases, particularly, in
developing countries.339

A.5. Import duty exemption and reduced excise duty schemes
The analysis shows that both Ghana and Kenya have interventions to increase the
production of domestically manufactured goods as a means to steer the needed industrial
growth. As such, there are no significant differences in tax incentives granted as import
duty exemptions in the two countries. In both countries, there are incentive programmes
targeting critical sectors including manufacturing, agro-processing, infrastructural
development under a PPP framework.340 General import duty exemptions for industrial and
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agricultural plant, machinery or equipment, or parts imported for investment purposes are
granted to investors in both countries. Three input categories have been identified under
import duty exemption schemes: first, raw materials, capital goods, agricultural inputs,
certain medicines, and medical equipment; second, semi-finished goods, to be used as input
in production; and third, finished products.341
In addition, in both countries, most machinery for manufacturing, and services
relating to goods in transit, are fully exempt from VAT. 342 Also, VAT exemptions are
provided for goods and services exported, and goods and services supplied for special
zones operations, or use in agriculture, health and education. 343 However, all other
imported finished goods attract VAT at the rate of 16 per cent in Kenya, and 17.5 per cent
in Ghana.
Moreover, both Ghana and Kenya have special tax incentive schemes by which
investors can negotiate for import duty exemptions for plant, machinery and equipment,
and other concessionary tax treatments. For example, in Ghana, under the GIPC Act, an
enterprise may apply for its plant, machinery, equipment or parts not exempted to be
exempted from import duties and related charges.344 Also, under the Minerals and Mining
Act 2006, mining companies registered with the Minerals Commission can apply for
import duty exemptions for mining equipment and machinery; under the Timber Resources
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Management (Amendment) Act, 2002, forest plantations and wildlife developers can apply
for import duties exemptions for plant, machinery and equipment. Similarly in Kenya,
under the Finance Act, 2018, strategic entities operating under the special operating
framework arrangement can negotiate for concessionary duty rates, special CIT rates, and
other incentive packages.
However, in both countries, there is much skepticism about the level of monitoring,
and it is unclear whether data on the entire range of negotiated incentives granted is kept
and used for tax reporting purposes.345 Additionally, the enabling Acts in both countries do
not make any provision for reporting, monitoring or assessment of tax incentives granted
to firms under the special schemes. And, in both cases, no regulation that makes provision
to that effect has also been sighted.346

A.6. Summary of the analysis
Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that in both Ghana and Kenya there are
apparent similarities in the tax incentive regimes – although there are differences in
codification and classification of incentive provisions. This observation also applies
generally across sub-Saharan African countries. There is a considerable degree of
similarities in tax incentive provisions, tax administrative structures, and investment laws.
In all the five categories of tax incentive identified for the study – namely: tax exemption
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and tax amnesty schemes; general reduced CIT rates; targeted reduction in the effective
CIT rate; DTAs; and import duty exemption and reduced excise duty schemes – both
countries have almost the same provisions, except slight variations in the duration and
administration of each specific tax incentive.
For instance, each of the two countries offers tax exemption and tax amnesty
schemes, with appropriate legislation providing for each scheme, and establishing
institutions to administer them. Also, in both countries, tax exemptions are granted with
the objective of promoting industrialization and facilitating exports. However, Kenya
grants more concessions under this scheme than Ghana – which implies that Kenya may
be in the position to attract more FDI, but stands a higher risk of revenue loss.
Further, although we should be concerned about the frequency – and the likely
attendant risk of abuse – of amnesty schemes in both countries, it is worth noting that the
objective of Kenya’s amnesty scheme appears novel and more ambitious, and may likely
have more positive impact on FDI attraction than Ghana’s. 347
Also, the analysis indicates that although the general CIT rate in Ghana is 25 per
cent, and the general CIT rate in Kenya is 30 per cent for resident corporations, and 37.5
per cent for permanent establishments (PEs), in both countries, concessionary CIT rates
are provide for entities in key priority sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture.
However, Ghana’s tax incentive programme under this category appears more elaborately
designed in favour of rural development than Kenya’s. That notwithstanding, Kenya’s tax
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incentives for the capital markets, may allow for less revenue loss than Ghana’s – although
the risk of revenue loss in both countries is still high.
Moreover, under targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate, Kenya is expected to
attract more FDI than Ghana. This is because, even though both Ghana and Kenya grant
deductions in priority sectors, Kenya offers more concessions in IDs and capital
allowances.
In addition, both Ghana and Kenya have signed DTAs with other countries – Ghana
has signed 12 DTAs, and Kenya has signed 14 DTAs. Also, as of 2016, Ghana had signed
2 TSAs with at least two OECD countries, and Kenya six. 348 In both countries, DTA
provisions are applicable on dividends, interest, royalties, and management and
professional fees. However, each of the two countries treats dividends and interest slightly
different from the rule prescribed under the OECD Model.
Finally, both Ghana and Kenya provide import duty and VAT exemptions for most
plant, machinery, and equipment in sectors such as, manufacturing, and the extractive
industries. Also, both countries have special tax incentive schemes by which investors can
negotiate for import duty exemptions for plant, machinery and equipment, and other
concessionary tax treatments. However, in both countries, there is much skepticism about
the level of monitoring, and it is unclear whether data on the entire range of negotiated
incentives is kept or used for tax reporting purposes. 349 Also, the enabling Acts in both
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countries do not make any provision for reporting, monitoring or assessment of tax
incentives under these special schemes.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The study makes ten recommendations to enable effective and efficient use of tax
incentives in sub-Saharan African countries. The recommendations are based on the results
of the analysis, which emphasize the need for improving the efficiency and effectiveness
of investment tax incentives in sub-Saharan African countries, to enhance transparency,
accountability, and effective administration of tax incentives, to reduce associated costs
and opportunity for abuse.

B.1. Ministry responsible for administering tax incentives.
First, in order to protect the tax base, reduce the risk of revenue loss through tax
incentives and secure national interest, it is recommendable that the Ministry of Finance,
through the tax administration (which is responsible for raising revenue), should be
responsible for administering tax incentives. Although it is advisable for all agencies
concerned with implementing the tax incentives to be involved in the formulation of the
incentive policy, as noted in chapter two, respective tasks should be well set out, and the
incentive programme should be crafted to best fit their objectives. 350 This will help reduce
the risk where one government body grants tax incentives without being responsible for
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balancing the revenue consequences. For instance, where the Investment Promotion
Agency (which is not responsible for raising tax revenue) is administering tax incentives,
it may be predisposed in granting tax incentives because it does not bear the associated risk
of revenue loss.
The recommendation is to address the observation that although in both Ghana and
Kenya, the operation of tax incentives is automatic, and the tax administration is largely
responsible for granting tax incentives, in many other cases, other regulatory authorities
are involved or are responsible for administering tax incentives. 351 In such cases, the tax
administration does not have absolute responsibility or discretion in designing and
administering tax incentive programmes. Different government agencies are involved in
designing investment regimes, approving projects, and monitoring investments, including
the Investment Promotion Agency, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Export
Processing / Free Zones Authority.352 However, the major objective of these agencies is
attracting investments – they are often less concerned about the risk of tax revenue loss or
protecting the tax base. This often results in conflict of interests and priorities of the
different governmental institutions.

B.2. Sunset clauses / termination of incentives
Secondly, to allow for a specific time to assess the success and failure, the merits
and demerits of tax incentives, and to reduce the potential costs of poorly designed

351

For example the grant of tax incentives for strategic investment under GIPC (see GIPC Act 2013, supra
note 19, s 26); and the grant of tax incentives for entities under special operating framework in Kenya (see
The Finance Act, 2018, (Act No. 10 of 2018) (Kenya), s. 11).
352
See Easson, supra note 350 at 161.

120

incentive programmes, it advisable that each incentive scheme contain a specific sunset
provision as part of the original legislation. Designing incentive schemes that have
provision for expiry will provide opportunity to assess whether the incentive has had the
desired impact and should be continued or not. This will then be a basis for policy reform,
or renegotiation of existing incentive provisions, and will help keep a balance between tax
stability for existing investors and equal treatment for new ones. In the absence of sunset
clauses and opportunities for review, tax incentive may become open-ended. For instance,
tax holidays may more or less turn into permanent tax exemptions. 353
This recommendation is based on the observation that in both Ghana and Kenya
most of the investment laws contain sunset clauses for specific tax incentive provisions
(e.g. tax holidays for a period of 3 -10 years, and concessionary CIT rates for 1-10 years);
however, sunset clauses are not provided for other tax incentive schemes such as import
and excise duty exemptions for plant and machinery; also, the incentive schemes as a whole
do not have sunset or termination provisions to ensure their cessation and assessment of
their impact on the economy. Furthermore, there are other investment laws that allow the
operation of stability clauses as guarantee against undesirable changes and securing
governments’ commitment. This can create room for abuse and provide a discriminatory
advantage for old firms over new ones, resulting in market inefficiencies. 354 For instance,
firms can keep importing plant and machinery and inputs and diverting them to be sold on
the market.
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B.3. Type of tax incentives to be granted
Profit-based tax incentive schemes, particularly, tax holidays and reductions in the
corporate tax rates, should be avoided. Instead, more cost-based tax incentives, such as
investment credits and accelerated depreciation, should be used. The cost-based tax
incentive should be designed within the scope of a realistic set of policy goals. 355 This is
because research suggests that profit based tax incentives are less efficient and effective,
and pose more administrative challenges when they are temporary (e.g. tax holidays),
geographically confined (e.g. economic zones), and when they provide full tax exemption
(as against concessionary CIT rates).356
Like many low-income countries, both Ghana and Kenya rely heavily on both
profit-based tax incentive including, tax holidays, preferential tax rates, and tax credits;
and cost-based tax incentives such as, accelerated depreciation and import duty
exemptions, investment allowances, to attract investment. As noted in the review of
literature, while cost-based tax incentives have been proven to be effective and less
expensive for developing countries, profit-based incentives are ineffective and costly. 357
The disadvantage of profit-based tax incentives is that they are more attractive for firms
with already high profits and short time horizons. Also, profit-based incentives can be
easily abused through tax planning and profit shifting. On the other hand, cost-based tax
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incentives directly lower the cost of investment, and can be targeted more closely at policy
objectives.358

B.4. Type of industry / sectoral target / type of taxpayer
To reduce the cost of tax incentives and help identify the types of investment that
governments seek to attract,359 tax incentives should not be offered broadly across all
sectors – they must be restricted and targeted at investments with the most desirable
objective, and most likely to be influenced by tax policy. Priority should be in targeting
efficiency-seeking (low production cost) FDI such as research and development and
investments that result in significant transfers of technology and infrastructural
development. However, this must be complemented by efforts to address the fundamentals
of the investment climate. The extractive industry, market-seeking investors, and relatively
highly mobile and profitable activities such as, banking and financial services, should not
be incentivized, or should have limited tax incentives schemes. Tax incentives for such
investments are often redundant – they require further evaluation or total removal. 360
Restriction and targeting of tax incentives is recommended based on the fact that
tax incentives can be more effective in attracting efficiency-seeking FDI than market- and
natural resource-seeking FDI. In spite of this, it was observed in the analysis that in both
Ghana and Kenya tax incentives are not targeted specifically at these sectors – they are
offered in almost every sector of the economy, from banking to manufacturing,
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infrastructure, agriculture, hospitality, natural resource extraction. Although both countries
claim that these sectors are key priority sectors, it can be noted that they are basically all
sectors that may form the bigger part of the tax base. Also, tax incentives are not
deliberately targeted, but rather are largely available to all investors – both foreign and
domestic, existing and new.
However, because incentives do not compensate for shortcomings and are likely to
succeed only if they are part of a broader strategy to address investment climate constraints,
targeting efficiency-seeking FDI also requires that each country focus on creating a
favourable overall investment climate.361 Investors are less likely to respond to even the
most generous incentives in the absence of a good investment climate, basic infrastructure,
reasonable transport costs, and a sound policy framework toward investment.
Macroeconomic stability and rule of law should be enhanced in order to correct market
inefficiencies. 362 Other sectors with high spillover effects, such as manufacturing, and
export-oriented investment, can then be targeted and incentivized. 363

B.5. Availability to both domestic and foreign investors
In sectors where tax incentives should be granted, they should be designed to
benefit both domestic and foreign investors. Equal treatment of investors is required
because incentivizing, encouraging and promoting both foreign and domestic investors is
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a prudent strategy that can maximize the potential of investment and offer flexibility in
directing investments for the benefit of national development. 364 It was noted in the
analysis that in both Ghana and Kenya tax incentives are available to both foreign and local
investors – this is a commendable practice that should be continued.
Restricting tax incentives to foreign or new investors can be ineffective or
unproductive. It may create a disadvantage for local enterprises. Further, domestic
investors, in order to meet foreign ownership requirements to qualify for incentives or take
advantage of favourable tax treaty provisions, may seek to disguise their investments by
channeling local investments through special foreign entities. Also, existing investors, in
order to continue to benefit from the incentives, may register subsidiary entities to continue
the same activity; or an existing business may be sold at the end of an incentive period to
a new investor who may then be eligible for a new period of tax incentives. 365

B.6. Tax amnesties
Tax amnesties should not be granted. Rather than resort to frequent amnesty
schemes, the tax administration in both Ghana and Kenya should improve upon monitoring
and enforcement – compliance provisions in the tax laws must be enforced intelligently,
but firmly. 366 It appears that in both countries the tax laws have the necessary provisions
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for effective enforcement, but the problem is the capacity and the will to do so. In any case,
the legal obstacles to the tax administrations’ access to taxpayer information must be
addressed to encourage compliance, and the need to generate higher revenues through
amnesty schemes should be evaluated against doing the same through enforcement. 367
While the most recent amnesty programme in Ghana was to encourage a voluntary
compliance culture, and broaden and update the tax base, the amnesty programme in Kenya
was to encourage voluntary repatriation of foreign-held assets, and facilitate the sharing of
tax information under the CRS regime.368
While it may be expected that an amnesty programme may foster compliance and
increase tax revenue collection, it is likely to be successful only when it is unanticipated. 369
Increasing the frequency of tax amnesties might not generate additional revenue, and may
even weaken compliance because existing tax defaulters will continue to evade tax in
anticipation of future amnesties, and compliant taxpayers will regard them as an unfair
reward to tax evaders.370
Additionally, although amnesty programmes can help transition individual, small
and medium taxpayers from operating in the shadows (or the informal) sector to the formal
367
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sector,371 as typical in many developing countries, tax amnesties may be necessitated by
fundamental weaknesses in the legal framework, and the management, and operations of
the tax administration. 372 Under such circumstances, amnesties will rarely address the
challenges in maximizing tax revenue. Prosecuting delinquents may then generate more
revenue for the regulator than an amnesty programme. 373 Therefore, amnesty programmes
should be stopped.

B.7. DTAs, including sparing agreements
In order to curb the risk of DTAs restricting the right to tax FDI inflows,374 and to
ensure that revenues are realised to their full potential, review of some of the existing DTAs
is needed, and general caution or circumspection is required in signing new DTAs or
including DTAs in tax treaties.375 It is further recommended that DTAs in the two countries
must be designed to contain provisions that will limit reductions in WHT rates, and allow
increased taxation of FDI inflows and other types of cross-border income. 376 Also, selective
application of DTAs must be encouraged – that is, DTA provisions must apply only to
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companies that meet specific tests, such as having genuine presence and being tax
compliant.377
Thirdly, it is recommended that both Ghana and Kenya consider developing or
adopting model DTAs (with increased reserved right to tax incomes derived in their
jurisdictions), and signing agreements on mutual assistance in tax matters. 378 It is also
necessary that both countries take steps to strengthen the technical expertise of tax officials
in treaty negotiation.379
The adoption of model DTAs is recommended based on the observation that both
Ghana and Kenya have signed a number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and DTAs
with other countries, based largely on the OECDMTC and the UN Model Double Taxation
Convention (UN Model).380 However, although DTAs can play a key role in international
cooperation on tax issues, and encourage FDI by reducing tax barriers, facilitating the
transfer of skills and technology, and reducing cross-border tax avoidance and evasion
through exchange of tax information and mutual assistance, the risk of signing unbalanced
DTAs appears significant in both Ghana and Kenya. In addition, it appears the two
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countries do not to have the requisite skills and experience to effectively negotiate and
administer DTAs to encourage FDI and at same time protect their tax base. 381
In most cases, apart from containing a number of loopholes, DTAs appear to be
designed to benefit foreign investors more than the governments. For instance, DTAs are
designed with unnecessary tax liability waivers and provisions that are harmful to domestic
resource mobilization. This, coupled with the fact that both countries are net capitalimporters, can limit their potential in preserving a greater share of taxing rights as source
countries. 382

B.8. Determination of eligibility
Clear, objective eligibility criteria for granting tax incentives, with as little
discretion as possible, should be established. Also, tax incentives should be awarded to
qualified investors based on the criteria set out in the law, rather than through a separate
approval process.383 Limiting granting of tax incentives within the confines of clearly spelt
out provisions in the relevant legislation will enhance predictability for investors and
reduce opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption. As noted earlier, one body – the
MoFEP – should be responsible for the grant of tax incentives. The agency responsible for
promoting and attracting investment should not also be responsible for granting or
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approving incentives. This will help avoid excessive cost associated with the grant of
incentives, and enable the counter-balancing effects to be captured.384
Additionally, if tax incentives are to influence investor decisions, the use of
discretion in granting tax incentives should be minimized. Where the use of discretion
cannot be avoided, to promote transparency and consistency, the relevant legislation should
set the general context within which the discretion may be exercised, the level that decision
is taken, and the limits within which the discretionary authority may be exercised. For
instance, a two-stage process involving minimum investment value and the exercise of
discretion can be developed.385
Minimizing the use of discretion in granting tax incentives is recommended based
on the observation that although in both Ghana and Kenya, tax incentives apply
automatically, 386 in a few cases, investors have to apply for incentives to be granted. In
Ghana, for example, strategic investments, and investment under special initiatives – the
1D1F, and the YEP – allow investors the right to apply for concessionary tax treatments.
Similarly, in Kenya, under the Finance Act, 2018, entities under the special operating
framework arrangement can negotiate for concessionary tax rates.
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B.9. Protecting the tax base and preventing tax incentive abuse.
To avoid conflict between foreign investment law and the general tax laws, and to
prevent incentive overlap and opportunities for abuse by investors, it recommended that all
tax measures should be consolidated in one legislation. Also, it is important that tax
incentives are matched to their targeted objectives through ongoing monitoring and
evaluation, to ascertain compliance with the conditions under which tax incentives are
granted. This can help detect non-compliance and abuse – intentional or unintentional –
and enhance predictability in the grant of tax incentives. 387 Also, the qualifying conditions
for tax incentives must be clearly set out and in detail in the legislation to enable potential
investors determine whether or not they qualify for the incentives, or what they have to do
to qualify. The qualification rules should also be justiciable, so that an investor who is
denied the benefit of an incentive can appeal against that decision. 388
These measures are recommended in view of the abuses that have been reported in
both Ghana and Kenya, and the fact that in both countries, granting tax incentives forms
part of the liberalization of foreign investment, and tax incentive provisions are set out in
several pieces of legislation, including the ITA and other FDI promoting laws.

B.10. Disclosure of cost to Parliament
Finally, in order to determine the potential costs and benefits of tax incentives, and
ensure proper accountability, transparency-enhancing reforms of tax incentives must be
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undertaken. 389 Tax expenditure analysis should be undertaken, and reporting should be
done by both taxpayers and tax authorities to parliament. This is because it has been noted
that in both Ghana and Kenya, tax expenditure reporting is not a requirement, and is seldom
carried out. But because the income tax law is an instrument to implement major social and
economic policies, and because revenue losses are associated with tax incentive schemes,
the development of tax expenditure budgets are required for tax incentive policies to be
given a critical public scrutiny. Tax expenditure reporting must, therefore, become an
integral part of the annual budget presentation.390
Reporting tax expenditures and disclosing information relating to them will provide
a comprehensive overview of the means that government uses to implement economic,
social and other policies, and how these policy objectives align with government spending.
This information will enable legislators and other users of public financial information
have access the purpose, effectiveness, the estimated fiscal cost, the method of estimation
and projections, and legal references of tax incentives.391
The end is to enable policy makers to craft more efficient, equitable and
administratively simple tax systems for raising maximum tax revenue. Reporting tax
expenditures will also increase the value of democratic governance by promoting
transparency through accountability in the allocation of public resources and distribution
of tax burdens. This may require that the capacity of the relevant tax administration be
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enhanced for there may not be much value in designing a complex system and the relevant
authorities lack the requisite capacity to implement it. 392
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The study analysed the tax incentive regime for promoting and attracting FDI in
sub-Saharan African countries, using Ghana and Kenya as a case study. The purpose was
to provide tax policy makers, academics, and administrators in sub-Saharan African
countries with a pragmatic and easy-to-implement approach to the design, administration
and assessment tax incentive programmes in order to achieve the objective of attracting
FDI, and at the same time maximize domestic revenue mobilization. This will enhance
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of tax incentives in these countries. 393
The use of tax incentives in sub-Saharan African countries threatens domestic
revenue mobilization and poses a challenge to sustainable development. Although tax
incentives have the potential to attract FDI, and have been successful in other jurisdictions,
in sub-Saharan Africa, empirical evidence of the impact of tax incentives indicates that
Saharan African countries are offering overly generous tax incentives and foregoing much
needed revenue for development. Not only have tax incentives been inefficient and
ineffective, but also tax incentives have been abused. In many cases, tax incentives have
provided opportunity for rent-seeking and corruption.
The study aimed to find a solution to the inefficient and ineffective use of tax
incentives in sub-Saharan Africa countries to attract FDI. It looked at the research question
of how Saharan African countries can improve upon the effectiveness of tax incentives in
order to increase FDI inflows and at the same time maximize tax revenue collection. In
other words, how can Saharan African countries best design their tax incentives to achieve
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the objective of attracting FDI, but minimize the risk of revenue loss through the use of tax
incentives?
In order to answer this question, the study conducted theoretical and empirical
assessment of the tax incentive regimes in Saharan African countries, using Ghana and
Kenya as case studies. To allow for the determination of the relative effectiveness of tax
incentive programmes in the two countries, the study compared the tax incentive regimes
of the two countries, benchmarking them with theoretical standard design and best practice
in other jurisdictions.
The study found that tax incentives in Saharan African countries are not well
designed and administered, and recommended legislative and administrative reforms
aimed at improving tax incentive design. The study further recommended that the objective
of attracting FDI must be well balanced with the need to maximize tax revenue. Also, tax
incentives should be targeted at efficiency-seeking FDI and not market- or natural
resource-seeking FDI. Finally, tax incentive programmes must be designed and
administered in a manner that will promote accountability and transparency of tax
incentives budgets, and ensure general tax expenditure analysis and assessment.
The study also found that tax incentives are ineffective in promoting FDI in
developing countries (particularly, African countries) because of poor investment climate,
and poor design of tax incentives. Furthermore, the study found that developing countries
continue to grant tax incentives due to five main factors: pressure to counterbalance the
poor investment climate; response to competitive pressures such as, lobbying from TNCs;
reliance on successful examples; non-involvement of the expenditure of funds in the use
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of tax incentives; familiarity with the use of fiscal incentives; and the general global use of
tax incentives to attract FDI.
The thesis was presented in six chapters. Chapter 1 provided an introduction and
theoretical background. It offered an outline of the general framework of the study, and set
the bounds within which the study would be conducted, including the significance of the
study, the methodology and the limitations. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on the
subject-matter. It identified contemporary scholarly and policy debates, and reviewed the
ways that the literature suggests developing countries can maximize the benefits from using
tax incentives. It also underscored the challenge of defining tax incentives, and delineating
tax incentives from the general tax system.
Three different definitions of tax incentives were considered: tax incentives as
special tax provisions which are a favourable deviation from the general tax laws, granted
to selected investment projects or firms; tax incentives as policies that provide for a more
favourable tax treatment of some enterprises or sectors as against what is available to the
general industry; and tax incentives as a system of tax expenditures under which
governmental financial assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions,
as against the provisions of the ITA (or any other tax legislation). Also, the need to
distinguish tax incentives from broader non-discriminatory fiscal incentives, such as,
general infrastructure development, the general legal regime for FDI and business,
including investment guarantees was noted.394
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In addition, six basic designs of tax incentives were discussed including tax
holidays, accelerated depreciation, special size or scale tax incentives, special sectors, and
special regions or zones.395 It was noted that in order to reduce the opportunity for
corruption and abuse of tax incentives, they should be coherent, simple, and transparent so
that their objectives and effect can be easily evaluated.396
Furthermore, evidence of the effectiveness of tax incentives in developed and
developing countries was considered. Tax incentives work for certain kinds of investments,
in certain situations, and in certain sectors, across all jurisdictions. 397 However, tax
incentives of the type offered by developed countries appear to be more effective than the
types of tax incentives offered by developing and transition economies, which were more
likely to result in revenue sacrifice than increased FDI.
Moreover, some of the measures that developing countries can adopt to ensure
efficient and effective use of tax incentives were discussed, including setting clear
objectives, having consolidated legislation, ensuring diligent record keeping, setting
compliance conditions, limiting the duration of FDI, and improving the investment
climate.398 It was also noted that, tax incentives should be designed to be of benefit to both
domestic and foreign investors. This is because both domestic and foreign investors are
equally likely to feel the distortionary and other adverse impacts of tax incentive policies;
tax incentives can play a useful role in encouraging both domestic and foreign investment;
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local investors are likely to venture into risky, long-term investment (with higher linkage
effects), compared foreign investors;399 and both domestic and foreign investments can
complement each other.
In chapter 3, the tax incentive regime for the promotion, attraction and facilitation
of FDI in Ghana was discussed. It was noted that the main FDI regulatory framework in
Ghana is the GIPC Act, 2013 (Act 865) (GIPC Act),400 under which the GIPC is established
as the main administrative body to regulate all aspects of FDI, except in minerals and
mining, oil and gas, and FZs. It was also noted that Ghana pursued economic liberalization
in 1983,401 and introduced a number of investment incentives. Ghana offers tax incentives,
including concessionary tax provisions, tax holidays, capital/investment allowances,
locational incentives and customs duty exemptions, tax credits, preferential rates, and other
inducements and benefits, intended to entice investors,402 but the effects of FDI in Ghana
have been undulating, and, therefore, there is still room for Ghana to improve its FDI
trend.403
Furthermore, the main legal framework on tax incentives available in Ghana was
discussed, including, the ITA, 2015 (Act 896), the GIPC Act, 2013 (Act 865), the FZA,
1995 (Act 405), the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703), Minerals and the Mining
Act, 2010 (Act 794).404 The major tax incentives were discussed under five broad headings:
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tax exemptions and tax amnesty, general reduction in the CIT rates, targeted reduction in
the effective CIT rate, DTA, and import duty exemptions.
The chapter concluded with an evaluation of the effectiveness of FDI in Ghana in
the mining industry and the FZs for the period 2008-15, drawing on two major studies –
one conducted by Actionaid International in 2015, and the other Prichard and Bentum
(2009).405 The impact of tax incentives on the two sectors has not been desirable.
Chapter 4 discussed the tax incentive regime for the promotion, attraction and
facilitation of FDI in Kenya. It provided an overview of the legal framework or the
regulatory regime of investment in the country, and noted that the major legislation for
regulating and promoting FDI in Kenya is the IPA, 2004,406 under which the KIA was
established as the lead institution in the promotion and facilitation of investment in
Kenya. 407
The chapter also discussed the history of efforts to attract FDI in Kenya for the
period 1963-2017. It noted that as in most developing African countries, Kenya’s FDI
flows have been subject to high volatilities, starting with less optimism about the benefits
of free trade and investment at independence in 1963. The chapter also indicated that
beginning in the 1970s through to the period 2010-2016 there has been alternation of
periods of rise and fall. Policy reforms, including the adoption of strategy on PPPs, restored
investor confidence, causing FDI inflows to rise from USD 681.325 (in 2016) to a high of

405

See Tax Justice Network-Africa, supra note 6 at 1-20; Wilson & Bentum, supra note 6 at 24-26.
See IPA, supra note 20; Kenya Vision 2030, supra note 218.
407
Ibid.
406

139

USD 1.625 billion in 2018. 408 The analysis projected that Kenya could keep the growing
trend for the period 2018‑20, but would have to enhance the investment climate through
further reforms, good governance, and improved security and infrastructure.
Furthermore, the framework of the tax incentives in Kenya was discussed. We
observed that Kenya offers a wide range of tax incentives to attract FDI, through
enactments such as, the ITA, the IPA, the EPZA, the SPZA, the VATA, 2013, Finance Act,
2018, and the Nairobi International Financial Centre, 2017.409 These incentives, including
tax exemptions, reduction in CIT rates, investment allowances, accelerated depreciation,
special zones, and indirect tax incentives, capital deductions, industrial deductions, and
farm work deductions were also discussed under five broad headings: tax exemptions and
tax amnesty, general reduction in the CIT rates, targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate,
DTA, and import duty exemptions.
The chapter concluded by assessing the potential effectiveness of the tax incentives
offered in Kenya, drawing on studies by the Institute of Economic Affairs, Kenya, (2012);
Tax Justice Network-Africa and ActionAid International (2012); and Mutua and Muya
(2013). It argued that, as in many other developing African countries, tax incentives have
not had the desired impact on the Kenyan economy – they have rather resulted in revenue
leakage than in inducing investment.410 It was suggested that Kenya focus on improving
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the investment fundamentals, and maximizing efficient tax collection rather than offering
tax incentives.
Chapter 5 analysed the tax incentive schemes in Ghana and Kenya. It concluded
that there are apparent similarities in the tax incentive regimes in both Ghana and Kenya,
although there are differences in codification and classification of incentive provisions. It
also revealed a considerable degree of similarities in tax administrative structures,
investment laws, and tax incentive provisions. In all the five categories of tax incentive
identified for the study – namely: tax exemption and tax amnesty schemes; general reduced
CIT rates; targeted reduction in the effective CIT rate; DTAs; and import duty exemption
and reduced excise duty schemes – both countries have almost the same provisions, except
slight variations in the duration and administration of the incentive.
Based on the analysis, we observed that in both Ghana and Kenya (and for that
matter sub-Saharan African countries) there is the need for improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of investment tax incentives – through carefully designed, and welladministered schemes – to ensure transparency, accountability, reduce associated costs,
and check abuse. Ten recommendations were made to enable effective and efficient use of
tax incentives in the two countries, and sub-Saharan Africa in general. These
recommendations are summarized as follows.
First, tax incentives schemes should be designed to achieve clarity in objective and
purpose, and there should be consensus among stakeholders regarding their general fitness
for purpose. In most cases, investment would have been undertaken even without the grant
and revenue losses in Kenya” (30 May 2012), online (pdf): Tax Justice Network <www.taxjustice.net>
[perma.cc/cms/upload/pdf/kenya_report_full.pdf] at IV, 7.
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of tax incentives. 411 Second, tax incentives should be targeted at sectors geared toward
export and mobile capital – these appear to be relatively effective – and not at sectors
producing for domestic markets or extractive industries – these generally have little impact.
Third, enabling conditions such as, good infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, rule of
law, should be enhanced. These are important for tax incentives to be effective and
efficient.
Fourth, there is the need to improve transparency in order to facilitate
accountability, and reduce the potential for rent seeking and corruption. This requires that
tax incentives be subject to parliamentary approval, be consolidated under the tax law, and
reviewed annually as part of a tax-expenditure budget. This will reduce their fiscal costs.
Fifth, the approval process of tax incentives should be consolidated ultimately under the
authority of the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, to be enforced and monitored
by the tax authorities. As much as possible, the granting of tax incentives should not be
based on discretion, but on the application of rules and procedures.412
Finally, tax incentives schemes should be simple and uniform, rather than
discriminatory. In all cases, the minimal use of tax incentives is advised – cost-based
incentives such as, accelerated depreciation, are more likely to be effective than tax profitbased incentives such as, tax holidays.
Chapter 6 provides the summary and conclusion of the study. Similar conclusions
apply to both Ghana and Kenya – that since it has been established that not only are tax
incentives not needed to attract FDI, but also that tax incentives have resulted in large
411
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revenue losses, and that the use of tax incentives has in recent years attracted very low
levels of FDI, it is important that both countries review their tax incentive regimes. For
Ghana, it is suggested that the real FDI attraction advantage may not be in just granting tax
incentives to transnational corporations. Ghana may have to minimize the use of tax
incentives, and focus on creating an enabling investment environment through measures
such as, good governance, the rule of law, prudent macroeconomic management, and
investment in infrastructure and training. Perhaps, these, coupled with tax incentive
schemes may be enough to attract investment to the desired levels. 413
Likewise, Kenya must focus on improving the investment fundamentals. It is
suggested that factors, including security, good governance, infrastructure, respect for the
rule of law, and openness to trade,414 must be given critical attention, as opposed to the
use of tax incentives, which is likely to result in further distortions in the tax system,
large administrative costs, rent-seeking and corruption.415 An alternative approach is for
the Kenyan government to maximize efficient tax collection, and use part of the revenue
to offer financial incentives through direct expenditures.416
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Final Reflections
The potential for growth in both Ghana and Kenya is great, and the prospects are
high. FDI remains a crucial source of external financing, and can play a key role in the
overall development process, by augmenting domestic revenue mobilization. The impact
of FDI can be great if well-harnessed in the financing and delivery of infrastructural
services. 417 The state of infrastructure has been one of the key inhibiting factors to growth
and development, and in turn, FDI flows. FDI can be leveraged into bridging the existing
infrastructural gap in critical sectors, such as transport (road, rail and inland water) and
energy, particularly through PPP arrangements. Attention must also be on attracting
efficiency-seeking investment that will facilitate technology spillovers, and enhance local
capacity in the manufacturing and extractive industries (minerals and oil).
Tax incentives can be more effective in attracting FDI when combined with other
non-tax factors that create an enabling climate for private investment, such as a strong
policy environment, and efficient and effective administration. 418 Policy measures to
maximize the advantages of FDI must clearly envision FDI into the overall development
strategy. Tax incentive schemes must be within a well-designed policy framework, and
supported by principles of independence and objectivity, responsibility and transparency,
and technical excellence. 419
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Given the substantial need for additional revenue in both countries, domestic
revenue mobilization should receive a new momentum to play a pivotal role in
complementing FDI. An effective and efficient tax incentive regime should result in
attracting more FDI, which in turn should boost tax revenue performance. Strong political
will is required to build a fairer, and a less corrupt tax system that effectively limits
incentives and opportunities for rent-seeking to spearhead development.420
Both Ghana and Kenya must improve the taxation of natural resources, and scale
back preferential treatments in the sector. A sustainably credible and a potentially
conducive tax regime is required in the natural resource sector. An efficient natural
resource incentive regime must complement other initiatives to ensure effective
management of the sector for a win-win outcome for both investors and governments.
Granting exemptions or preferences in the natural resource sector that are not available
under the standard fiscal regime should be avoided, and tax expenditure and policy analysis
must be regularly undertaken.
There should also be strong capacity building through international cooperation and
regional integration in tax policy and administration for the sustainable management of
natural resources. Designing an effective incentive regime for the natural resource sector
poses a particular challenge because investments involve high initial costs, investors are
normally TNCs capable of sophisticated tax planning, and the resources by their nature are
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depletable. 421 To effectively tax this sector, governments must encourage investor
credibility, and ensure equitable sharing of risks and returns between them and investors.
State interest must include a combination of royalties and progressive profit-based taxes
that are effectively monitored and evaluated. Royalties can pass additional risks to
investors (who may be in a better position to take corrective measures than governments),
and profit-sensitive taxes can ensure that governments get a fairer share of the rents. 422

421
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Table 1

Tax rates applicable under DTAs in Ghana

France
United Kingdom
Germany
South Africa

Dividends (where
the recipient holds
at least 10% of
shares) %
7.50
7.50
5.00
5.00

Belgium
Italy
The Netherlands
Switzerland
Czech Republic
Denmark
Singapore
Mauritius

5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
6.00
5.00
7.00
7.00

Country

Dividend (in any
other case) %

15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00

15.00
15.00
10.00
15.00
6.00
15.00
7.00
7.00

Royalties Technical or
management
%
service fee
%
10.00
12.50
10.00
12.50
8.00
8.00
10.00
10.00

10.00
10.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
7.00
8.00

10.00
10.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
10.00
10.00

Interest %

12.50
12.50
10.00
10.0 (5.0 for
non-resident
banks)
10.00
10.00
8.00
10.00
10.00
8.00
7.00
7.00

The DTA with Czech Republic is yet to be ratified.
Source: ww.pwc.com.

Table 2

WHT rates applicable in Ghana

Payment

Rate

Dividends

8.00

Royalties, natural resources payments and rents

15.00

Management and technical service fees

20.00

Goods, works or any services

20.00

Repatriated branch after-tax profits

8.00

Interest income (excluding individuals)

8.00

General insurance premiums

5.00

Income from telecommunication and transportation business

15.00

Payments to petroleum subcontractors

15.00

Source: ww.pwc.com.
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Table 3

Tax rates applicable under DTAs in Kenya

Payee Residence

Dividends

Interest

Royalties

Management
and professional
fees

%

%

%

%

Canada

10.00

15.00

15.00

15.00

Denmark

10.00

20.00

20.00

20.00

France

10.00

12.00

10.00

20.00

Germany

10.00

15.00

15.00

15.00

India

10.00

10.00

10.00

10.00

Norway

10.00

15.00

20.00

20.00

Sweden

10.00

15.00

20.00

20.00

United Kingdom

10.00

15.00

15.00

12.50

-

15.00

15.00

15.00

South Africa

10.00

10.00

10.00

20.00

Qatar

10.00

10.00

10.00

20.00

5.00

10.00

10.00

20.00

10.00

12.00

10.00

20.00

Zambia

UAE
South Korea

Where the treaty rate is higher than the non-treaty rate, the lower rate applies.
Source: EY Kenya Tax Guide 2019.
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Table 4

WHT rates applicable in Kenya

Payment / Withholding Tax
Dividends - Housing Bonds
Dividends - Government bearer bonds
Dividends - Other sources
Deemed interest
Commission on insurance brokerage
Commission on other activities
Royalties
M anagement, professional, and training fees
Contractual fees
Real estate rent
Telecommunication service fees
Lease of equipment
Services of a petroleum or mining service-subcontractor with no PE
Transfer of a petroleum or mining interest
Natural resource income
Pension and retirement annuities
Sporting or entertainment income
Winnings
Demurrage charges
Insurance premiums
Source: EY Kenya Tax Guide 2019.
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Resident Non-resident
%
%
10.00
5.00
15.00
10.00
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00
20.00
5.00
20.00
10.00
20.00
5.00
20.00
3.00
30.00
10.00
30.00
10.00
5.00
15.00
5.63
20.00
10.00
20.00
5.00
5.00
0-30
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
5.00
-
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